In 2004, when the Congress led UPA government came to power it repealed the POTA, which it admitted had been grossly misused. It simultaneously amended an existing law, the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act 1967 (UAPA), siphoning into it some of extraordinary provisions of POTA, including those pertaining to banning of terrorist organizations. The conditions of banning under the amended Act no longer require a statement to explain the reasons of issuing a ban, a gazette notification merely adding an entry to the Schedule of the Act is sufficient, and there do not exist any provision for judicial redress.
On 22 June 2009, the CPI (Maoist) was added to the list of banned organizations in the Schedule of the UAPA. The Home Minister has claimed that the notification banning the organization was made necessary to remove ambivalences. Indeed, the CPI (M-L), PWG, and the MCC, which later merged to form the CPI (Maoist), were banned organizations since 5 December 2001. Apart from the futility of banning, the notification shows the total disregard the government continues to have towards people’s movements around issues of livelihood, dispossession and alienation that have accumulated and aggravated over the last several years of the unleashing of neo-liberal policies on unsuspecting tribal populations and the rural poor.
It is indeed ironical that a month back, this government had claimed to have returned to power on the weight of its social policy programmes. The politics of banning is indeed reflective of a regime which despite its electoral victory, has but a truncated social base. Banning the CPI (Maoist), is therefore, not just arbitrary, it shows that the UPA government has lost the political courage to address the substantive issues of land and livelihood that the adivasis have been raising across the country in Chhattisgarh, Orissa or West Bengal. While banning itself is undemocratic and constrains the ideological spaces of freedom, in this case, it seems to also send across the message that like the government of any authoritarian state, this government too would prefer to use the law to suppress dissent violently. Much has been made of Maoist violence in the press. Without condoning this violence, PUDR would ask the Home Minister to note the extremely debilitating socio-economic contexts which has precipitated the adivasi movements in the country, and use the electoral mandate it has received to direct attention where it is required most, and in a way which is conducive to democracy through long term social programmes addressing issues of economic disparity.
Moushumi Basu
Gautam Navlakha
Secretaries
PUDR
Share and Enjoy:These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
War-hysteria in media: cobras, shields, and sanitization
We have been witnessing what can only be described as “war hysteria” in the media coverage of the current situation in Lalgarh and adjoining areas. It appears as if the great protectors of the “rule of law”, the West Bengal state police, propped up by the CRPF and a plethora of other armed forces, with suitably scary acronyms like COBRA, are out to regain a chunk of Indian territory occupied by a hostile country. What is conveniently not being mentioned is that for ages the police itself has behaved like invaders in the area, willfully torturing and humiliating people, and that is why they had been boycotted in that area for the past six months. With blow-by-blow accounts of their progress, and description of how they are penetrating “human shields”, and “sanitizing” whole areas, it doesn’t seem that their adversaries are the poorest of the poor, the most marginalized sections of Indian society, the adivasis who are armed with traditional weapons like bows and arrows, and some Maoist cadre, who would be a few dozen at the most, and armed mostly with weapons looted from the police and improvised explosive devices.
The trigger in Dharampur: a popular response to rampaging harmad militias
More importantly, what is being represented as a war between the Maoists and the Indian state, conveniently glosses over some points that we need to pay our attention to. The rural area of Lalgarh has been out of bounds for the administrative machinery of the state since last November, since the uprising of the adivasi-moolvasi people of the area against police atrocities. With the setting up of the PCPA, the adivasis had been running their own affairs, and even taking up much-needed developmental work, a whiff of functioning democracy in the middle of the hoax that goes on by the name of democratic governance in large parts of India.
Then, what suddenly triggered this confrontation, and this cascade of events that is today witnessing police dragging out women from houses in the Lalgarh area and beating them blue and black and hundreds of people fleeing to relief camps?
It points to the incident which happened in Dharampur, near Lalgarh town, on June 14th. It was reported in the press on that day, but now has been conveniently forgotten as the press is busy to set up the Maoists, and the PCPA, which they repeatedly call Maoist-controlled contrary to all evidence and denials by the PCPA leadership, as the arch-villains in this episode.
Dharampur is near Lalgarh town, and it was a CPI(M) stronghold where the house of the zonal committee member, Anuj Pandey, was located. On 14th June, a PCPA rally was proceeding towards that place, called to protest against the arrest and reported rape of adivasi women who had gone to a meeting in Chakulia in Jharkhand. It was a usual PCPA rally, with traditional weapons and led by women as usual. When it neared Dharampur, it was attacked by CPI(M) harmads, targeting the women. The rallyists couldn’t resist this attack and dispersed, but then a Maoist squad arrived and started a gun battle with the CPI(M) cadres, which continued till late in the night.
With their superior firepower, the Maoists gunned down at least nine of the CPI(M) attackers. Thereafter, the next day there were multiple rallies called by the PCPA, and the people in these rallies, who were incensed by the CPI(M) attack of the previous day, decided to take over the CPI(M) strongholds of Dharampur, a major operating base for the CPI(M) harmads, and Lalgarh town which was still under the administrative control of the government. The Maoist squad accompanied them, to resist attacks by the CPI(M), and not allow a repetition of the past day’s incident.
20,000 Maoists and “frontal organisations”?
What followed has been widely reported, how CPI(M) party offices were burnt down, how the palatial house of Anuj Pandey, the widely hated CPI(M) leader, was broken down, and how some CPI(M) members were killed. It was a spontaneous outburst of pent up fury of the people, people who had been subjected to humiliation and exploitation by these same CPI(M) leaders on a daily basis. They acted out of a sense of deliverance from the hegemony and corruption of the CPI(M). The Maoists were definitely present, but the 10,000-20,000 people who participated in this uprising were definitely not Maoists, as has been represented by the press. They were common people, and their anger and frustration found expression in this outburst. Although a number of political leaders, including those from the Trinamool Congress and Congress, made statements to this effect, it has completely been glossed over by the mainstream press.
Human shields – a physical protection of liberty and development
In order to reinforce this idea, multiple press reports have tried to represent the human walls set up by the adivasis as “human shields” being used by the Maoists to protect themselves from the police and paramilitary. It is possibly incomprehensible to the corporate media that these people were standing there not to protect the Maoists, but to protect the freedom that they have enjoyed for the past six months, freedom from daily harassment and humiliation, and to preserve the gains that they had made during that time, like the building of a few roads and digging of a few ponds, meeting the immediate needs of the people, things that Indian state has not provided in the past sixty-two years.
Teaching adivasis a few lessons along the way
However, as expected, they could not resist the brute force unleashed by the same state that had failed them so miserably. The police and paramilitary dispersed them by teargas and lathicharging, and since then there has been innumerable reports of atrocities being committed by the police. Remarkably, much of these atrocities were committed in the villages on the way to Lalgarh town, which were not even within the zone that was under the control of the PCPA. It appears that the state is bent upon teaching the adivasis a lesson for standing up for their dignity, and the Maoists represented a suitable bogey for doing so. The Maoists, according to their stated policy of guerrilla warfare, would not engage in a frontal confrontation with the paramilitary forces. So what have effectively taken place are a few skirmishes between vastly assymetrical adversaries, and the brave saviours of “law and order” have vented their righteous ire on the unarmed adivasis.
Maoist presence: an old fact and a rehashed bogey
The Maoists have been active in the entire jangalmahal area for a long time, and have been fighting a running battle with the state. The adivasis in the area have long been victimized by the police for this, and it was the police brutalities in the wake of the landmine attack on the West Bengal CM’s convoy by the Maoists that triggered this uprising. The Maoists have been with the adivasis of Lalgarh in this uprising against the state, just as members of many other political parties including the Congress, have been with them. What we are witnessing today is that the Indian state is using this as an excuse to delegitimize the just demands and aspirations of the adivasis, which stemmed from a simple demand for the recognition of their dignity. Attacks on indigeneous people are taking place all over the world, whenever they are resisting the state and the corporations attempt to deprive them of their land, water, forests and dignity, as we recently saw in the attacks on the Peruvian indigeneous people in the Amazon area. All attempts to resist and retaliate are being represented as insurgency and a breakdown of “law and order”. The corporate press is playing along with this, as we see in the case of Lalgarh, and deliberately glossing over facts and issues, to represent the struggle of the indigeneous people, in which armed struggle is increasingly playing a part, as a loss of sovereign authority by the state, which has to be regained at any cost.
Ground dynamics and civil society
The “civil society” in West Bengal, and all over India, has rightly been very distressed over these incidents and condemned both the atrocities committed by the state and what many think to be the reckless behaviour of the Maoists. However, it is also to be expected that the civil society cannot decide, or dictate, what course a movement on the ground will take. A movement develops its own dynamics, based on the ground conditions, and always does not follow a linear path to the most desirable end. Therefore, it becomes the duty of civil society to stand up and be counted when common people are at the receiving end of oppression by the state. We should express our solidarity with the struggle of the adivasis for justice and development, deplore the atrocities being committed on them by the armed forces of the state and demand the immediate withdrawal of the latter from the area as a necessary condition for normalization of the situation and also condemn all the attempts by the state to use this excuse to impinge on the democratic rights of the people. The adivasis had risen up with the demand of a small apology from the police, if what is happening now does not stop, the Indian state will owe them a much bigger one.
Share and Enjoy:These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
A shorter version of this article was published in Hindustan Times
In politics, the truth is almost always counter-intuitive. In this realm – where the art of the possible intersects in strangely unexpected ways with the science of the impossible – ominous portents of anarchy often conceal messianic promises of deliverance. Lalgarh, today, is perhaps the starkest symbol of this confounding cocktail, which has come to characterise the polity of Left Front-ruled West Bengal. But the violent upheavals, which have been rocking this tribal-dominated village of West Midnapore over the past several months, are unlikely to yield any meaning as long as socio-political violence continues to be envisaged as a moral question. If anything, such a moral approach would only produce counter-productive programmes and practices that would inexorably push politics further down the hopeless pit of a degenerate status quo.
Whether the Lalgarh movement constitutes an unconscionable disruption of social peace, or is a legitimate popular upsurge cannot be conclusively determined unless the objective political condition and logic of that movement and its subjective ideological orientation, especially with regard to the adoption of violence as an instrumentality of politics, is accurately accounted for. What clearly distinguishes the Lalgarh uprising from other apparently similar violent incidents and agitations that have scarred West Bengal over the past few years, and which have registered a sudden spurt in the aftermath of the resounding victory of the Trinamool Congress-Congress alliance over the CPI(M)-led Left Front (LF) in the 15th Lok Sabha elections, is that the calculus of competitive electoral politics has had absolutely no bearing on the movement. The reason why electoral considerations have figured rather significantly in most other zones of unrest in the state is because the strife in those zones has been ignited mainly by the collapse of the CPI(M)-led LF’s well-oiled and calibrated network to differentially distribute political patronage by way of governance. This has particularly been the case in areas such as Nandigram and Singur where the main battle has been against acquisition of farmland for industrial development.
The struggle for patronage is essentially a competitive struggle that has no concern loftier than that of conserving and progressively concentrating positions constitutive of a structurally inequitable and undemocratic status quo. That does not, however, mean the distress and disaffection caused by the collapse of such patronage, which is all that is there by way of governance in LF-ruled West Bengal, is not real. The trouble is the political idiom in which such genuine anxieties are being articulated is, in being shaped by the all-pervasive regime of patronage politics, thoroughly competitive. That has inevitably rendered such mass movements susceptible to all sorts of cynical manoeuvres and manipulations.
The popular eruption in Lalgarh, on the other hand, has been driven by no such competitive consideration precisely because the remote tribal belt of which it is a part has had little or no patronage network to begin with.
The insurgency of the Lalgarh population has been shaped by its experience of a state that has registered its presence in the area through the brutal effectiveness of its repressive security apparatuses but has been absent as an organic expression of the will of the people and an efficient purveyor of emancipatory social development and vital public goods. Clearly, the problem there is not, as many seem to believe, the absence of the state but its existence as a completely alienated and foreign entity. Those being the objective conditions for the emergence and expansion of the Lalgarh movement, it is highly unlikely that it is capable of positing, or even articulating, anything other than a transformative critique of the alienated and repressive state, and the intrinsically competitive and hierarchical socio-economic order that engenders it.
And that is precisely why the temptation to classify the Lalgarh uprising as a tribal identity movement, driven by the ideology of some organic notion of autonomous communitarianism, should be resisted. The majority population of Lalgarh is doubtless tribal but the anti-competitive orientation of their struggle, thanks to the objective politico-economic conditions that have shaped them, serves to completely invert the competitive logic of identitarian movements, which always articulate their politics in supremacist terms of ethno-cultural pride and domination. Put simply, the Lalgarh movement clearly manifests characteristic features of a working-class struggle.
The People’s Committee against Police Atrocities-led revolt, which was sparked seven months ago by a repressive combing operation launched by the West Bengal police in Lalgarh and surrounding areas in response to a Maoist mine attack on the chief minister’s cavalcade, has steadily morphed into a more proactive and comprehensive struggle for a fundamental transformation of the socio-political structure. That has yielded a two-pronged movement of resistance and reconstruction. It is, therefore, no accident that the PCPA, which has been leading the militant mass movement against the West Bengal government in Lalgarh, is now also at the forefront of an incipient social reconstruction programme for the enforcement of a cooperative and democratic management of resources and rudimentary public services such as healthcare developed by the local community itself.
That the CPI(M)-led West Bengal government, infamous for its autocratic ways, was extremely cagey until a few weeks ago to crack down on the movement was largely due to its mass insurrectionary character. In Lalgarh, violence against state apparatuses has not been launched by a clearly identified group acting on behalf of an oppressed but largely passive population. Instead, it has been an expression of disaffection and opposition by a population entirely insurgent against a repressive state and the oppressive socio-economic order it protects and perpetuates. Even the guerrilla operations carried out by Maoists in the area and its neighbourhood have become a seamless extension of this insurrection, which inevitably enjoys wide-ranging local legitimacy and has some serious moral standing, vis-à-vis the rest of the state. It is this legitimacy, which derives from an assertion of popular sovereignty, that had kept West Bengal’s Stalinist dispensation away from open repressive manoeuvres for so long. That it had burnt its fingers in Nandigram, where its cadre together with the state police had attempted a scorched-earth operation a couple of years ago, has only compounded its diffidence on that score.
After all, a modern state formation, no matter how repressive, has to always act in the name of protecting popular sovereignty. But in an insurrectionary situation, like the one in Lalgarh, the sovereignty vested normatively in the state is clearly in conflict with actual sovereignty on the ground. In such circumstances, the state, if it cracks down on the movement, runs the grave risk of losing all formal legitimacy it enjoys as the keeper of people’s sovereignty. In fact, it is the state or the government that, in such a situation, comes to be seen as an external threat to the sovereignty of the people and the violent insurrection of the latter against the state pushes it and its laws into a state of crisis. That renders the legal-illegal dichotomy problematic and consequently makes it difficult for the state to legitimately monopolise violence to crush popular movements in the name of combating anti-sovereign lawlessness and insurgency. That is a risk the CPI(M)-led LF could ill-afford at a moment when the electoral drubbing it has received in West Bengal signals significant erosion of its moral-political standing.
The Lalgarh movement could, nevertheless, hardly have gone on for ever without inviting the wrath of the ruling classes of West Bengal and India. The only way a movement like that could possibly evade state repression and keep itself alive and kicking is through continuous political growth accomplished through a relentless process of engagement and integration with concerns, anxieties and disaffections in other areas and sectors of the state. Yet, an unpardonable tactical blunder on the part of the Maoists, who indisputably have a sizeable numerical presence in the PCPA, has cleared the way for the West Bengal government to unleash repression on the Lalgarh movement sooner rather than later. The recent claims by various senior Maoist leaders and activists that the PCPA was a front of the underground outfit, which was controlling and running the show in Lalgarh, has given the repressive arms of both the LF government of West Bengal and, to a lesser extent, the Centre the alibi they had been waiting for. The West Bengal government has, over the past few days, turned proactive and has been dispatching contingents of heavily armed police and central paramilitary forces to Lalgarh to crush the popular uprising. That the LF dispensation has suddenly regained its usual repressive element is because it knows the police operation in Lalgarh would now be widely perceived as a legitimate measure taken by the state to protect popular sovereignty from Maoists and some sections of the local community they have bamboozled.
The Maoists, thanks to their doctrinaire programmatic commitment to agrarian revolution and the concomitant tactical emphasis on guerilla struggles exclusively in tribal and rural areas of the country, have failed to focus on developing large-scale popular movements in the semi-urban and urban areas. Their time-worn approach of encirclement of cities by people’s army raised from the countryside has, willy-nilly, militarised their politics, what with their roving guerrilla squads carrying out dramatic raids on behalf of a rural population they have barely organised. That, among other things, has ensured their politics enjoys little concrete ideological-political support among working people in Indian cities. As a result, it has been rather easy for the state at all levels and the ruling classes it represents to paint the Maoist movement into an illegal corner and successfully delegitimise it as an external threat to popular sovereignty.
The Maoists doubtless have a significant numerical and ideological presence within the PCPA and the wider Lalgarh movement. But the committee, which is much more diverse in its broad Left ideological composition, is far from being a front of the Maoist group. And that, as far as the Maoist commitment to a militant working-class movement is concerned, would have spelt no harm. If anything, the Maoists and their sympathisers in Lalgarh ought to have envisaged such a situation as an opportunity for them to continue to work quietly within the PCPA and provide the insurrectionary movement with requisite logistical support and ideological orientation to expand politically to engage with and integrate a multitude of other disenfranchised and exploited sections of West Bengal’s society and economy such as the embattled peasants of Nandigram, Rajbongshi separatists of north Bengal plains, the Gorkhas of Darjeeling and the large masses of workers rendered unemployed by the sharp decline in the fortunes of the state’s tea and jute industries. This process of integration through continuous engagement would have had to address the specific concerns of each of those sections even as it transformed their mutually competitive idioms of political articulation into a coherent but multitudinous critique of the logic of the larger political economy responsible for all their various miseries. That would not only lead to an aggregative programme of social change but would also make Maoism into an ideological current that is always internal to an ever-growing variety of popular movements.
In such circumstances, the modality of political violence would always be that of popular insurrection. And even guerrilla tactics, as and when they are deployed, would necessarily be envisaged as an integral part of this insurrectionary paradigm. That would not only make it hard for the state to delegitimise such violence as illegal or the movements that generate them as anti-sovereign, it would also ensure that Maoism is rescued from the excesses of its current sectarian militarism that have, often enough, ended up replicating the same configurations of superordinate state power, which the movement has sought to unravel.
Clearly, the Maoists can avoid tactical blunders like the one they have committed in Lalgarh only when they re-frame their political-organisational vision. Their obsession with territorial expansion, which has spelt no real political-ideological breakthrough for Maoism, essentially stems from the Maoists’ insistence on envisaging the party as an a priori state-form, which seeks to subordinate the singularity of various experiences of disaffection and registers of struggle to its doctrinaire conception of politics, which is no more than the generalisation of one particular experience of social oppression and resistance. What they need to do, instead, is to imagine the organisation as a movement-form, wherein Maoism is a dynamic organisational impulse and the party is always in a state of bottom-up formation through a perpetual process of politicisation at the grassroots.
West Bengal, ironically enough, provides the most conducive political climate for the Maoists to effect such a reorientation. Their struggles against a repressive state, controlled for over three decades by a coalition of Left forces helmed by the largest Communist Party, ought to compel them to reflect on how communist-left forces, which were once the undisputed principal representatives of a genuine working-class movement, have come to distort it beyond recognition.
The degeneration of the CPI(M)-led LF, contrary to the popular belief shaped by the neo-liberal consensus, is not because of its failure to turn fully social democratic but precisely because it has abandoned the tortuous dirt-path of working-class struggle for the comfortable highway of social democracy. Social democracy, which envisages social progress and the well-being of the working people and the poor essentially as a question of distributive justice, is a form of governance that seeks to equitably distribute a given basket of socio-economic entitlements. In such a ‘Leftist’ scheme, there is no place for interventionist and transformative politics because the state, which for social democracy is an instrument of efficient regulation and equitable redistribution, is treated as a passive and neutral entity that must be captured and then merely controlled.
The state, however, is in reality constitutive of an exploitative, oppressive and hierarchical social order. To that extent, a radical socialist programme must actively articulate the tendency to erode, not capture, it. For, it is only through such erosion that the structural reinforcement of a stratified society can be undermined. The preposterous contradiction the CPI(M)-led LF has created between industrial development that is inescapable, and universal democracy that is indispensable, is a symptom of its social-democratic degeneration. Its failure to imagine more democratic and participatory configurations of socio-political power, which could drive truly cooperative consolidation of land and other resources, and posit an alternative model of development, is because of its social-democratic fixation on the state.
That the Maoists too should call themselves the CPI(M) – Communist Party of India (Maoist) – is uncanny. But more eerie perhaps is the fact that their conception of the party as a state-form predisposes them to a social democratic approach to politics that virtually makes them a mirror-image of the original CPI(M). It’s time the Maoists woke up and smelt the gunpowder.
Share and Enjoy:These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
FOR REGULARLY UPDATED NEWS AND VIEWS ON LALGARH, VISIT SANHATI.COM
The tribal body that started the seven-month- old Lalgarh agitation with Maoist backing today threatened a “fight to death” in the face of the government offensive.
“We were born here, we are agitating here and we will die here,” said Chhatradhar Mahato, chief of the People’s Committee against Police Atrocities [PCPA].
“The barricades will continue. The more they are forcibly removed, the deeper will be the (public) anger at the police and support for us.”
Mahato, speaking to The Telegraph at Barapelia, 5km north of Lalgarh town, said the movement had begun because of the “government’s long neglect of the tribal people, who have been surviving on ant eggs for far too long”.
“Our movement is for the development of the people. They (the government) cannot gain people’s confidence by using force,” Mahato, the secretary of the committee, added.
He expressed surprise that the state government had called in paramilitary and additional police forces in response to the destruction of a house being built by Anuj Pandey, the CPM’s Binpur zonal committee secretary.
“Yet no one is asking how this leader could build such a palatial mansion,” he said.
Mahato alleged that Pandey’s brother Dalim, Lalgarh CPM local committee leader, had amassed huge wealth. “Whenever any land transaction took place in the region, he would take a commission. Why were the police brought in to protect these tainted brothers?”
The committee [PCPA] secretary wondered why no action was taken when CPM offices were burnt in Khejuri and the police boycotted at the behest of Trinamul Congress MP Subhendu Adhikari. “The same government is now using central forces against us….”
Committee president Lalmohan Tudu, who too was at Barapelia, said everyone in the region supported the movement. “The battle has entered the heart of Lalgarh. The forces will now see what they are up against.”
Singrai Baskey, resident of Kantapahari, 7km north of Lalgarh town, said: “We are with the movement. We have realised how much this movement means to us now that the entire nation has its eyes fixed on Lalgarh.”
Share and Enjoy:These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
David McNally, Professor at York University and leading member of the New Socialist Group (Solidarity’s sister organization in Canada, www.newsocialist.org), talks about the roots of the the financial crisis and its precise role in the worldwide economic downturn–as well as the depth of its social costs. From the Marx and the Global Economic Crisis panel at the 2009 Left Forum in New York.
Anwar Shaikh, Professor at the New School for Social Research, gives a Marxist account of historic fluctuations in the capitalist economy and how the current crisis fits in the overall picture. From the Marx and the Global Economic Crisis panel at Left Forum 2009, New York.
Bhopal, Jun 8 (PTI) Noted playwright and theatre director Habib Tanvir died at a hospital here today after a brief illness. He was 85.
The theatre legend was admitted to the National Hospital here three weeks back after he complained of breathing problems and was put on a ventilator, family sources said.
His daughter Nageen was at his bedside when the end came.
Born on September 1, 1923 at Raipur, Habib began his career as a journalist and went on to become a highly renowned playwright.
Known for his plays like Agra Bazar and Charandas Chor, Tanvir founded the Naya theatre company here in 1959. He also scripted many films and acted in a few of them.
He was awarded the Sangeet Natak Akademi Award in 1969 and Padma Shri in 1983. (Courtesy: PTI)
Share and Enjoy:These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
Sub: Intervention sought in the mass arrest of rural poor and dalit workers in Punjab
Dear Sir,
We are writing to seek your urgent intervention in the mass arrests of dalit agricultural labourers in Mansa, Sangrur and Bathinda districts of Punjab. Since 21 May, over 1300 agricultural labourers and labour leaders, including 511 women and 42 children, have been locked up in different jails of Punjab. Almost all the activists and leaders of the Mazdoor Muktio Morcha and the CPI(ML) (Liberation) in Punjab have been jailed, and even the most peaceful protests and ordinary political activities by these groups is facing a crackdown. Some of the senior activists have been isolated from the others and confined along with hardened criminals and are being harassed within the jail. This includes Jasbir Kaur Nat, a National Council Member of the AIPWA, who is held in Naba jail , in violation of her rights as a political prisoner.
The arrests have happened in the course of a struggle for NREGA job cards and homestead plots promised by the SAD-BJP State Government. The SAD-BJP Government launched this offensive immediately following the Lok Sabha elections, where the results reflected the disenchantment of the rural poor with the government.
In Punjab, where agriculture is highly mechanised, rural poor often get very few days of employment a month – whereby the rural poor had pinned their hopes for survival on the extension of NREGA to all rural districts in the country. Consequently, the failure of the administration to provide NREGA job cards, and the fact that the Punjab Govt. returned 350 crores of NREGA funds unused to the Centre, became a major issue.
The Akali-BJP Government had moreover reneged on its promise to provide homestead plots (5 marla plots for every rural poor family). It was in protest against this denial of basic rights of livelihood and housing, that agricultural labourers of Mansa district, led by the Mazdoor Mukti Morcha and CPI(ML), occupied a portion of panchayat/commons land allotted to be leased to workers. Under the Land Consolidation Act 1961, one-third of panchayat land is meant for agricultural workers on lease for cultivation – and it was this land that the agricultural workers used to build their hutments, until such a time that the Government would keep its promise to allot house plots.
Naturally, for women from dalit labouring background, the issue of both NREGA job cards and land is a very important one, and so they participated in very large numbers in the agitation.
This movement for land and work began prior to the elections and continued even during the elections. The Akali-BJP Government, it seems, has waited till the elections were over, to begin an all-out crackdown. The agricultural workers had begun a peaceful dharna on 17 May and held a massive Rally on 19 May, which put enough pressure on local officials to effect an agreement to ensure job cards within one month and house plots to all within three months. The very next day, local upper caste land owners began a road-roko protest demanding eviction of the poor from the panchayat land, and, one cue, on 21 May, labour leaders, including even the General Secretary of the All India Central Council of Trade Unions (AICCTU), Comrade Swapan Mukherjee, were arrested. On 22 May, over 1000 workers including a very large number of women and children were arrested and jailed – from the dharna site, from their homes, and from the office of the Mazdoor Mukti Morcha and CPI(ML). Young children have been separated from their jailed mothers and sent to junvenile and delinquent homes without informing the parents on where their children have been confined.
The ostensible excuse for the arrests was the need to vacate the so-called “illegal occupation” of the panchayat land – but the arrests have continued even after the forcible eviction of the poor from that land, and the demolition of their makeshift homes.
In Punjab, when rich farmers habitually occupy common land, land allotted for waste disposal, etc. the government never lifts a finger against them. It is a shame that the same government, having blatantly broken its promises of housing and livelihood, has unleashed severe repression when poor rural workers are demanding fulfilment of the government’s own promise.
Even today, activists of the AIPWA, Mazdoor Mukti Morcha and CPI(ML) outside jails are being threatened with arrest at the slightest sign of any peaceful protest or ordinary political activity like party meetings. Activists who have not been jailed are being held under virtual house arrest, without any warrant and in complete violation of their fundamental rights, as the offices and homes are being encircled by the police and ordinary movement hampered. This unspoken emergency has a dimension of class and caste bias – since it is the organisations of the rural workers and dalits which are being targeted and prevented from functioning.
We demand your Government’s urgent intervention to ensure an end to the repression, harassment and witch-hunt being unleashed on the rural poor by the Punjab Government, immediate and unconditional release of all arrested activists and leaders of the AIPWA, Mazdoor Mukti Morcha and CPI(ML), and fulfilment of the basic and inalienable demands of agricultural labourers for land, housing and jobs.
This video offers a brief history of Sri Lanka and the Eelam struggle according to Thozhar Thiagu, activist and General Secretary of the Tamil National Liberation Movement in Tamil Nadu, India. I met with Thiagu at his office and at his home in Chennai, Tamil Nadu in February 2009. The struggle for Tamils in Sri Lanka continues despite the alleged end of the war in May 2009. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed in the final weeks of war. Hundreds of thousands of civilians are displaced without food, shelter or medical supplies. Seeking refuge from government bombardment of their homeland in the north and eastern provinces, thousands of Tamils have fled from Sri Lanka since the mid 1980’s.
Share and Enjoy:These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
In the recently concluded 2009 general elections to the lower house of the parliament, the Social Democratic Left (SDL henceforth) In India, composed of the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM), the Communist Party of India (CPI), and a bunch of smaller left-wing parties, has witnessed the severest electoral drubbing in a long time. This year, the CPM won a total of 16 parliamentary seats; compared to its performance in the last general elections in 2004, this is a whopping decline of 27 seats. The CPI, on the other hand, won 4 seats in 2009, suffering a net decline of 6 parliamentary seats from its position in 2004. Does this mean that the Indian population has rejected even the mildly progressive and social democratic policies that the SDL tried to argue for at the Central level? Is this a mandate for the Congress party and by extension a mandate for neoliberalism? I think not. This is a mandate against the SDL but not against social democratic policies; this is a mandate against neoliberalism and for welfare-oriented policies. To the extent that the Congress was pushed by the SDL to partially implement such pro-people policies, it can possibly be interpreted as an indirect endorsement of Congress’s late-in-the-day populism. After making a few comments on the national mandate, in this article, I focus my attention on West Bengal, the bastion of the SDL in India.
Mandate versus Outcome
Let us begin by distinguishing between the mandate and the electoral outcomes. The change in the number of seats won and lost (the electoral outcome) is only a partial, and imperfect, reflection of the change in the actual level of support parties enjoy among the people (the mandate); often the particular logic of electoral arithmetic draws a wedge between the mandate of the people and the electoral outcome in terms of seats won or lost. For instance, it is possible for a party to increase its share of votes polled without this increase leading to any increase in the number of seats won; conversely, it is possible for a party to decrease its share of votes polled without losing in terms of seats. An example of the former is BSP’s performance at the national level in 2009: it has emerged as the third largest national party, increasing its share of votes polled from 5.33 percent in 2004 to 6.17 percent in 2009, but this has not translated into any appreciable increase in terms of seats. An example of the latter is CPM’s performance in Tripura: its share of the votes polled dropped from 68.8 percent in 2004 to 61.69 percent in 2009, but that did not affect its position in terms of seats. Hence, to understand the structure of the "popular will," it is necessary to go beyond the position in terms of seats won and lost; one needs to study the changes in the shares of votes polled.
Focusing on the share of votes polled is also enough, among other things, to dispel certain misinterpretations of the mandate of the 2009 general elections that seem to have wide currency. The first misinterpretation that is gaining ground is the alleged existence of a "wave" in favor of the Congress party which swept it to power overcoming the ubiquitous current of anti-incumbency. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Despite having won 206 parliamentary seats, the Congress merely won 28.55 percent of the votes polled in 2009; this is a little less than a 2 percentage point increase from 2004. 29 percent can hardly be interpreted as a "massive wave"; besides, this overall increase also hides substantial decreases in several important states such as Orissa, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Andhra Pradesh. The second misinterpretation that is doing the rounds is that this general election saw the definite demise of regional parties and all federalist tendencies of the Indian populace; the people voted overwhelmingly for national parties, the argument goes, because they want stability. Whether people desire stability is a questions that cannot be entered into at the moment, but the fact that the populace did not reject regional parties in favor of national parties can be seen by looking at the share of votes going to the Congress and the BJP together: according to provisional figures released by the Election Commission of India, the combined vote share of the Congress and BJP in fact declined from 48.69 percent in 2004 to 47.35 percent in 2009. Thus, the share of votes going to the two main national parties has declined; so much for the ascendancy — what historian Ramachandra Guha called the "course correction" — of the tendency for centralization in the Indian polity.
Social Democratic Performance: National Level
How did the social democratic parties perform in terms of the share of votes polled? At the national level, the CPM lost only marginally in terms of its share of votes polled, which declined from 5.66 percent in 2004 to 5.33 percent this year; the CPI, on the other hand, gained marginally at the national level, increasing its share of votes from 1.41 to 1.43 percent. Thus, going by these national figures, there is no evidence of any nationwide "wave" against the social democrats’ opposition, however feeble, to the neoliberal policies of the Central government. Those who want to interpret the current debacle of the social democrats as a national mandate against progressive economic and social policies need to rethink their arguments; the evidence does not support such an argument. In fact, as I will argue below, if there can be discerned any "wave" in favor of the Congress in the mandate, it is largely a "wave" against neoliberal economic policies and not the other way round as many pro-establishment analysts are making it out to be.
But the national level figures hide many interesting state-level variations, so we must look at state-level data. There is another reason why we need to supplement national level with state-level analysis: since the SDL is prominent only in the three states of Kerala, Tripura, and West Bengal, the national figures are not very relevant to assessing the electoral prospects of the social democrats. Hence, we must look at state-level data for Kerala, Tripura, and West Bengal to understand the sharp change in the electoral performance of the social democratic Left in India and draw conclusions about its continued relevance in the Indian polity.
Social Democratic Performance: State Level
How did the social democrats perform in the different states? First, the SDL managed to increase its vote share in a few states: Andhra Pradesh, Goa, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Uttaranchal, and Andaman & Nicobar Islands. Apart from Manipur, of course, the total vote share of the SDL in these states remains insignificant; hence, the increase in the vote share did not even remotely translate into changes in seats. Second, the SDL lost its share of votes polled in a large number of states: Assam, Bihar, Jammu & Kashmir, Kerala, Maharashtra, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, West Bengal, and Jharkhand. The percentage declines in Punjab and Jharkhand were very large, though that did not affect the reckoning in terms of seats because the SDL did not have seats to start with, i.e., in 2004. Third, the states where the loss of vote share wreaked havoc for the SDL’s reckoning in terms of seats were Kerala and West Bengal: in Kerala, the share of votes going to the SDL declined from 39.41 percent in 2004 to 37.92 percent in 2009; in West Bengal, the share of votes garnered by the SDL declined from 50.72 percent in 2004 to 43.3 percent in 2009.
Let me summarize the evidence presented so far: the SDL’s marginal decrease in vote share at the national level was made possible by the offsetting of the decrease in vote share in several states by the increase in others. The fact that this marginal decrease led to such a debacle in terms of seats is driven by the fact that the bulk of the decrease in vote share was concentrated in the electorally important states of Kerala and West Bengal whereas the increase in vote share was spread out electorally across states where the SDL is marginal. Thus the state-level distribution of the increase and decrease of vote shares for the SDL turns out to have profound implications in terms of electoral outcomes at the national level.
Social Democrats Help the Congress
This, of course, brings us to this important question: why was the bulk of the decrease in vote share for the SDL concentrated in Kerala and West Bengal? The clue to an answer is provided by the fact that both states, Kerala and West Bengal, currently have social democratic governments, led by the largest social democratic left party in the country, CPM. In both states, the social democratic governments have, over the past few years, increasingly accepted, adopted, and pushed neoliberal economic policies, often in the name of development and industrialization. Thus, we saw the emergence of a paradoxical situation: the SDL opposed, however feebly, the continued adoption of neoliberal polices at the level of the Central government, while the same set of policies was aggressively pursued in the states where they were in power. The debacle of the SDL in the two most electorally important states of Kerala and West Bengal can, therefore, be understood as a strong rejection of this doublespeak and hypocrisy of the SDL. The rejection of the SDL at the level of these two states, moreover, dovetails into the overall mandate in favor of progressive and social democratic policies, and against the neoliberal turn, at the national level. Of course there were other local factors, both in West Bengal and in Kerala, that overlaid this broad rejection of the neoliberal turn and turned the mandate decisively against the SDL in both these states. Before we look at some of these factors, especially for West Bengal where the debacle of the SDL was the most stunning, a comment about the so-called national "wave" in favor of the Congress is in order.
The so-called nationwide "wave" in favor of Congress, if there was one, resulted to a large extent from the slew of populist policies that it adopted, paradoxically pushed towards this by the SDL, over the last few years. These include the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), the step-up in public investment in agriculture, the debt relief program for farmers, the Right to Information Act 2005, the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act 2006, the Unorganized Workers’ Social Security Bill 2008, and the setting up of the Sacchar Committee to inquire into the continued marginalization of Muslims in the country. The Congress cashed the benefits of this populist swing electorally claiming it to be its own policies whereas, in truth, the SDL was largely instrumental in pushing for these policies at the central level. Other such social democratic policies pushed for by the SDL include: opposition to financial sector reforms (pensions, insurance), opposition to outright privatization of the public sector, opposition to privatization of health care and education. These defensive actions by the SDL have partially limited the unbridled power of capital to exploit labor and have provided some relief to the mass of the working people in India. It is, therefore, no surprise that corporate India is exultant at the social democrats’ drubbing at the hustings in 2009. The stock market in Bombay went into a tizzy immediately after the results were out and trading had to be stopped for a while to deal with the unprecedented euphoria! As many media reports show, the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), and other business groups have already started preparing their "wish-list" of reforms, by which they mean another round of neoliberal policy assault; quite unsurprisingly, land reforms does not figure in this wish-list of "reforms."
The SDL’s ability to counter the Congress claim that the populist thrust was a result of a progressive shift in the party, in reality fiercely opposed by entrenched interests within the Congress, was severely limited by the SDL’s de facto record in the states where it was in power: Kerala and West Bengal. Thus, paradoxically, while the SDL was largely responsible for creating the populist shift in the Congress party and thereby creating a "wave" in its favor, it could not transform this effort into any substantial electoral advantage for itself; and this was largely because of its doublespeak and hypocrisy, saying one thing at the Central level and doing exactly the opposite at the State level.
Probably nothing brings out this doublespeak and hypocrisy of the SDL better than the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). The NREGA, which provides a guarantee of a minimum of 100 days of work to the rural poor, came into effect on February 2, 2006 in 200 of India’s poorest districts. This provision was originally brought by grassroots-level mass movements in Rajasthan and other states in India, and was later adopted and forcefully pushed by the SDL at the central level. While the NREGA has been constantly attacked in the mainstream press as a waste of resources and a useless policy initiative, it has in fact created substantial benefits for the rural proletariat and poor peasants; even though there is still a lot of room for improvement, the NREGA has managed to improve the lives of the rural poor by putting a floor on agricultural wages and assuring some days of employment, both of which resulted in increased rural incomes.
West Bengal: A Closer Look
How did the NREGA fare in West Bengal and Kerala compared to other states? In 2006-07, the person-days of NREGA employment generated per rural household was 6 in West Bengal and 3 in Kerala, with both states figuring in the list of the 3 worst performers. Compared to this, the all-India average was 17 person-days, and Chhattisgarh generated 34, Madhya Pradesh 56, Assam 70, and Rajasthan 77 person-days. A similar picture emerges for the next year, too: in 2007-08, West Bengal generated 8 person-days and Kerala 6 person-days, much below the all-India average of 16 person-days. The dismal performance of the state government led the Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samity (PBKMS), a non-party, registered trade union of agricultural workers, to file a public interest litigation in the Calcutta High Court on non-implementation of the 100-days work guarantee scheme in West Bengal.
Coming back to the factors specific to West Bengal that led to this stunning electoral defeat of the SDL, we must complement the story of the state government’s surrender to neoliberalism with its misguided arrogance. The utter failure in the implementation of the NREGA went hand in hand with other overt neoliberal policy moves: privatization of health care, privatization of education, the full-scale assault on the public distribution system, and an aggressive State-sponsored attack on farmers to "acquire" their agricultural land for a neoliberal industrialization drive. Singur and Nandigram stand as symbols, at the same time, of both this attack by the State on behalf of corporate capital and also of the fierce resistance to this brutality by the poor peasants and landless laborers. The arrogance of the SDL-led state government was on gruesome display during the "re-capture" of Nandigram in March 2007, a violent attack on the people opposing forcible land acquisition, and also in the manner it dealt with the case of Rizwanur Rahman. Coming as it does in the background of the dismal conditions of the Muslims in the state, the total insensitivity displayed in the Rizwanur Rahman case increased the ire of the common Muslim population against the SDL-led state government. Taken together, all these factors created a massive wave of anger and resentment against the state government and resulted in the unprecedented electoral debacle of the SDL in West Bengal.
A Spurious Argument
At this point, we need to closely scrutinize an alternative argument that is doing the social democratic rounds. This argument, which purports to provide an explanation of the electoral defeat of the SDL in West Bengal, runs something like this: the Left Front made a great tactical mistake in severing ties with the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) at the Center on the issue of the 123 treaty (nuclear deal) with the USA; this severing of ties with the Congress allowed the Trinamool Congress (TMC) and the Congress (INC) to forge an alliance in West Bengal; this alliance managed to consolidate the anti-Left votes and directly resulted in the electoral drubbing of the SDL in West Bengal.
This argument, if true, would provide some solace to the SDL leadership in India. By shifting the responsibility of the electoral debacle onto the logic of alliance arithmetic, the SDL would manage to skirt some difficult issues of policy and politics. But, alas, the argument does not hold water when confronted with evidence. There is a simple way to determine the validity or otherwise of this, to my mind, spurious argument. If it were true that the SDL debacle was fueled mainly by the consolidation of anti-Left votes (because of the Congress-TMC alliance), it would mean the following: the SDL’s share of votes polled would remain relatively unchanged between 2004 and 2009. This is a straightforward testable implication of the above argument. What does the evidence say on this?
In Table 1 we have summarized data about the change in the vote share of the Left Front (CPM, CPI, AIFB, and RSP) at the level of the parliamentary constituencies between the general elections in 2004 and 2009; a negative number implies an increase in the vote share from 2004 to 2009, and a positive number implies a decline. As can be seen from Table 1, out of the 42 parliamentary constituencies in West Bengal, the SDL’s vote share went down in 39, ranging from 0.49 percent in Balurghat to a whopping 34.8 percent in Hooghly! The only 3 constituency where the SDL managed to increase their vote share is: Malda North, Murshidabad, and Ghatal; in all the other constituencies its vote share fell between 2004 and 2009. There were 25 constituencies where the share of votes garnered by the SDL fell by more than 5 percentage points, there were 11 constituencies where the vote share fell by more than 10 percentage points, and there were 5 constituencies where the vote share declined by more than 15 percentage points. Can we, in the face of this overwhelming evidence of a massive anti-SDL wave, still stick to the story of the supposed consolidation of anti-Left votes as the primary reason behind the SDL debacle?
Table 1: Constituency-Wise Decrease in Vote Share of the Left Front from General Election 2004 to 2009
Constituency
Change
Constituency
Change
Malda North
-5.71
Kanthi
7.67
Murshidabad
-1.09
Malda South
7.68
Ghatal
-0.66
Arambagh
7.74
Balurghat
0.49
Darjeeling
7.99
Uluberia
1.58
Mathurapur
8.06
Medinipur
1.70
Bishnupur
8.28
Jalpaiguri
2.11
Tamluk
8.50
Asansol
2.51
Bongaon
8.89
Kolkata South
2.80
Basirhat
9.05
Diamaond Harbor
2.98
Birbhum
9.65
Raigunj
3.13
Krishnanagar
12.53
Dum Dum
3.62
Barasat
12.54
Bardhaman Purba
3.69
Joynagar
12.91
Jangipur
3.80
Barrackpur
12.97
Ranaghat
3.88
Kolkata North
13.64
Bahrampur
3.99
Sreerampur
13.72
Alipurduars
4.48
Bolpur
15.65
Jadavpur
5.35
Purulia
15.94
Howrah
5.61
Bankura
16.62
Cooch Behar
6.88
Bardhaman-Durgapur
16.99
Jhargram
7.12
Hooghly
34.80
Beyond Elections
There is no denying the fact that the SDL played an important role in halting the juggernaut of neoliberalism in India through its intervention in the formation of the Common Minimum Programme of the UPA; and this was largely possible, given the political situation five years ago, because of the sizeable parliamentary presence of the SDL at the Central level. If nothing else, the reaction of corporate India to the electoral debacle of the SDL is proof of the partial efficacy of the SDL’s past interventions. But there are, I would submit, at least two serious problems of a strategy that focuses primarily on electoral politics as the SDL does.
First, most of its interventions, even though salutary, are at best defensive actions. The ruling classes set the agenda and move forward with a concrete program of neoliberal reforms and the SDL reacts to that agenda: it tries to halt the speed of the reforms, tries to win a battle here or there, without in any real sense questioning the logic of the whole move. The logic of the whole move can only be questioned when there is a positive agenda guiding political intervention. In the absence of such a positive political program, it boils down to the following: the ruling class ushers in the policy triumvirate of liberalization, privatization, and globalization, and the SDL merely reacts to these. In such a scenario, the best outcome can only be a return to the status quo, not a move forward towards a socialist future.
This brings me to the second, and related, problem of the SDL strategy. The fact that the Communist parties, now part of what I have called the SDL, have lost the political offensive in the context of the class struggle in India also finds reflection in their over-emphasis on electoral politics, to the virtual exclusion of all non-electoral struggles. Over the last two decades, there is not one significant non-electoral struggle that the SDL initiated or led; all its attention and energy has been fixed towards how to maintain its electoral position. More often than not, the SDL has been willing to enter into opportunistic and unprincipled alliances to attain short-term electoral goals, little realizing that this opportunism leads to long-term political setbacks. At times it has even gone with the BJP to keep Congress out of power, quickly reversing the logic at the next moment and aligning with the Congress to defend secularism. Caught in these endless electoral antics and working within a framework whose rules have been set by the ruling classes, the SDL has gradually distanced itself from its programmatic concerns of a people’s democratic revolution. To recover its potency and relevance, the SDL must refashion itself by forging links with the rising tide of mass movements in India against the neoliberal offensive and overcome its obsession with electoral politics. If post-poll statements of the SDL bigwigs are anything to go by, however, they have decided to do exactly the opposite: blame the electoral debacle on external factors, avoid any serious rethinking, and continue with elections as the primary focus of SDL politics.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Correction
While computing the numbers for Table 1, I had not fully taken account of the delimitation of parliamentary constituencies that took place in 2008. Hence, some of the numbers in Table 1 are inaccurate because the parliamentary constituencies themselves have changed. Thus, while it is difficult to accurately see how the 7 percent statewide decline in vote share of the Left Front is distributed across all the parliamentary constituencies (which is what Table 1 inaccurately reported) because of the 2008 delimitation of constituencies, we can nonetheless figure out the changes in vote shares in those that remained relatively unchanged by the delimitation process: Balurghat saw a marginal decline of 0.49 percent, Raigunj a decline of 3.13 percent, Alipurduars a decline of 4.48 percent, Cooch Behar a decline of 6.88 percent, Darjeeling a decline of 7.99 percent, Birbhum a decline of 9.65 percent and Bolpur witnessed a massive decline of 15.65 percent. But the statewide decline in the vote share of the Left Front remains unchanged and thus my main argument remains unaffected; only the distribution of the change in vote share across parliamentary constituencies has changed. Once the Election Commission of India comes out with data at the assembly segment level, one can recompute the numbers that make Table 1 to get a more accurate picture; the trend of declining vote share for the Left Front, though, will remain unchanged.
Share and Enjoy:These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
Abstract: This paper uses aggregate-level data as well as case-studies to trace the evolution of some key structural features of the Indian economy, relating both to the agricultural and the informal industrial sector. These aggregate trends are used to infer: (a) the dominant relations of production under which the vast majority of the Indian working people labour, and (b) the predominant ways in which the surplus labour of the direct producers is appropriated by the dominant classes. This summary account is meant to inform and link up with on-going attempts at radically restructuring Indian society.
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Karl Marx.
INTRODUCTION
Assessing the nature and direction of economic development in India is an important theoretical and practical task with profound political and social implications. After all, any serious attempt at a radical restructuring of Indian society, if it is not to fall prey to empty utopianism, will need to base its long-term strategy on the historical trends in the evolution of the material conditions of life of the vast majority of the population. Attempting to contribute to past debates and as part of on-going attempts at radical transformation of Indian society, this paper tries to provide a summary account of the evolution of some key structural features of the Indian economy over the last few decades.
The principal questions that motivate this study are: what types of production relations does the vast majority of the working population in Indian agriculture and industry labor in? How is economic surplus appropriated from the producers? The aim is not merely to arrive at a label such as “capitalist,” “semi-feudal” etc; nor to enter into a debate over whether the transition to capitalism is occurring as expected or not. Rather we are motivated by a desire to understand the material conditions under which the working population labors and the manner in which it is exploited.
The analysis is largely pitched at the aggregate level, complemented, wherever possible, with micro-level studies and data. While a study of the structural evolution of the Indian economy is of interest in itself, this paper uses trends in the structural evolution of the Indian economy to make inferences about the mode of generation, appropriation and use of the surplus product in Indian society.1 The focus on surplus appropriation, in turn, is motivated by the Marxist idea that the form of extraction of unpaid surplus labour provides the key to understanding the structure and evolution of any class-divided society. This important insight was most clearly articulated by Marx in Volume III of Capital:
The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producers determines the relationship of domination and servitude, as this grows directly out of production itself and reacts back on it in turn as a determinant. On this is based the entire configuration of the economic community arising from the actual relations of production, and hence also its specific political form. It is in each case the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the immediate producers - a relationship whose particular form naturally corresponds always to a certain level of development of the type and manner of labour, and hence to its social productive power - in which we find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social edifice, and hence also the political form of the relationship of sovereignty and dependence, in short the specific form of the state in each case.(page 927, Marx, 1993; emphasis added.)
The emphasis on the form in which surplus labour is extracted from the direct producers is important and worth dwelling on a little. Every class divided society rests on the appropriation of unpaid surplus labour of the direct producers; the fact that one group of people can, due to their location in the process of production, appropriate the surplus labour of another group is what defines a class. The appropriation of the surplus labour of direct producers by the ruling class is as much true of a feudal organization of production as it is of a capitalist mode of production. What distinguishes the two is the form in which this surplus labour is appropriated by the ruling classes, not the fact of surplus extraction per se. It is only in the capitalist mode of production that the surplus labour of the direct producers, i.e., the workers, takes the form of surplus value and is mediated through the institution of wage-labour. While this makes the exploitation of workers less apparent under capitalism, it also distinguishes the capitalist mode of production from non-capitalist modes, where the appropriation of surplus labour is much more visible, direct and brutal. For instance, in the feudal organization of society in Medieval Europe, the surplus labour of the serf was immediately visible as the work he did on the lord’s land; the surplus labour took the form of the product of the serf’s labour. The visibility of exploitation, understood as the appropriation of unpaid labour time of the direct producers, is lost under capitalist relations of production; it is obscured by the institution of wage-labour.
The study attempts to identify the evolution of the modes of appropriation of surplus labour in India indirectly by studying the evolution of key structures of the Indian economy at the aggregate level. The underlying assumption of the whole study is that the evolution of the aggregate economic structures, like ownership patterns in the agrarian economy, the evolution of labour forms like tenancy, wage-labour, bonded labour, the size-distribution of firms in the informal sector, the patterns of employment and migration, the importance of merchant and finance capital, etc., can provide useful and reliable information about the mode of surplus extraction. While it is possible to form a picture of the aggregate evolution of the Indian economy using data available from sources like the NSSO, the Agricultural Census, the Census of India – and that is precisely what we do in this study - we are fully aware of the limitations of such aggregate accounts. Many micro-level variations are lost in the aggregate story and so, wherever possible, the aggregate picture is complemented with case studies.
The study is broadly divided into two sections, one dealing with the agrarian economy and the other with what has come to be called the “informal” industrial sector. This twin focus is motivated by several considerations. First, the agrarian economy accounts for the largest section of the country’s workforce and population; this makes it a natural focus of any study which attempts to understand the evolution of the Indian economy and society at the aggregate level. Second, while the non-agrarian economy consists of the industrial and the services sector, the majority of the workforce in these two sectors is, again, found in what has been called the “informal” sector; that is why this becomes one of the foci of this study. Third, to the extent that an understanding of the relations of production (and forms of surplus extraction) is at issue, the “formal” industrial and services sector are probably beyond the domain of any debate; most serious scholars and activists would agree that the “formal” sector is characterized by capitalist relations of production. Since, what seems to be at issue is the “correct” characterization of the relations of production and forms of surplus extraction in the agrarian economy and the non-agricultural “informal” sector, this study focuses on precisely these two as an intervention in the broader debate about the characterization of Indian society.
Here we present a summary account of our findings, first for the agricultural sector and then for the “informal” industrial sector and end by raising some political and philosophical issues for discussion; for more empirical details and sources of the data readers are requested to look at the full article (which is posted here as a pdf).
AGRICULTURE: TRENDS AND SUMMARY
Our analysis of aggregate level data has revealed the following significant trends in the agrarian economy of India:
1.The share of GDP contributed by agriculture has steadily declined over the last five decades; this decline has not been matched by a decline in the share of the workforce engaged in agriculture. The result of these two trends has been a declining share of per capita value added from the agricultural sector. This has essentially consigned a large section of the Indian working population to very low productivity (and low income) work.
2.The average size of agricultural holdings, both ownership and operational, has seen a steady decline over the last five decades, with the average ownership holding in 2002-03 being 0.73 hectares.
3.The ownership of land remains as skewed as it was five decades ago; several measures capture this skewed pattern of ownership in the agrarian economy. For instance, the Gini coefficient of landholding ownership concentration has remained practically unchanged between 1960-61 and 2002-03. In fact it has marginally increased between 1991-92 and 2002-03.
4. While the aggregate distribution of land ownership remains as skewed as before, interesting and important patterns are visible within this unchanging aggregate picture. The share of land owned by large (10 ha or more) and medium (4 ha to 10 ha) landholding families has steadily declined over the last few decades from around 60% to 34%; the share owned by small (1 ha to 2 ha) and marginal (less than 1 ha) landholding families has increased from around 21% to 43%, while the share of semi-medium (2 ha to 4 ha) families has remained unchanged at around 20%.
5.Parallel to this decline in the share of land held by large landholding families is their decline as a share of rural households; on the other hand, there is a large increase in the share of small and marginal landholding families among rural households. In 2002-03, 80% of rural households were marginal landholding families; the corresponding figure was 66% in 1960-61. Both these trends seem to indicate the declining economic, social and political power of the landowning class in India.
6.The geographical (inter-state) variation of landholding ownership pattern allows us to divide the Indian states into two groups: large landholding states, and small landholding states. In the “large” landholding states, a substantial share of total area is still owned by relatively large landholding families; in the “small” landholding states, the share of land held by large or medium landholding families is very small. The former group consists of: Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan; the second group consists of: Assam, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, J&K, Kerala, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal.
7.Going hand-in-hand with the decline in the share of land owned by large landowning families, is the steady decline of tenant cultivation and its gradual replacement by self cultivation in Indian agriculture. The share of operational holdings using tenant cultivation declined from about 24% in 1960-61 to about 10% in 2002-03. There are large geographical variations in the extent of tenancy, with the largest share of leased-in land as a share of total operated area occurring in Punjab and Haryana, two prominent examples of what we have called large landholding states; Orissa has high prevalence of tenancy and is an example of what we have called small landholding states. The proportion of area owned and the proportion of area operated by the different size-classes are almost equal; hence, there is no evidence of reverse tenancy on any substantial scale at the aggregate level, though this might hide reverse tenancy at state or regional level.
8.In most places where tenancy exists, the largest form of the tenancy contract is still sharecropping. In 2002-03, share cropping accounted for about 40% of the land under tenancy; this has more or less stayed constant over the decades. An important exception is Punjab and Haryana, the two states which have the largest share of leased-in land, where the predominant form of the tenancy contract is for fixed monetary payment.
9.Effective landlessness is large and has steadily increased over the past few decades. The share of effectively landless households in total rural households has increased from about 44% in 1960-61 to 60% in 2002-03.
10.Small holding agricultural production has increasingly become economically unviable over the years. In 2003, the average income from cultivation was insufficient to cover even the very low level of consumption expenditures of the majority of rural households. This is one of the primary causes behind the recent increase in rural indebtedness. This increasing difficulty of sustaining incomes through cultivation was probably what led close to 40% of farmers in 2005 to suggest, in the course of a NSSO Survey, that given a chance, they would opt out of agriculture. Changes in the agrarian structure of India seem to have already brought the question of collectivization on the historical agenda. We return to this point in the conclusion.
11. Disaggregating total incomes of rural households engaged in agriculture show that wage income has become the main source of income for a large majority of the population. For about 60% of the rural households in 2003, the major share of income came from wage work, supplemented by income coming from petty commodity production, both in the agricultural and non-agricultural sector. Another 20% of rural households drew equal shares of their total income from wage work and cultivation, both at about 40%.
12.Prevalence of informal sources of credit through moneylenders had seen a sharp decline over the 1960s and 1970s, but the decline seems to have been halted since the early 1980s. The moneylender has made a comeback in rural India, facilitated by a steady retreat of the institutions of formal credit.
13.There was significant capital accumulation in the agricultural sector during the 1970s and 1980s; this has drastically fallen during the 1980s and has picked up a little during the 1990s. The fall in the growth rate of capital formation has been largely driven by the fall in public sector investments in the agrarian economy.
Putting all these trends together, one is led to the following tentative conclusions (more in the nature of a working hypothesis): over the past few decades, the relations of production in the Indian agrarian economy have slowly evolved from what could be characterized as “semi-feudal” towards what can tentatively be termed “capitalist”; this conclusion emerges from the fact that the predominant mode of surplus extraction seems to be working through the institution of wage-labour, the defining feature of capitalism. Articulated to the global capitalist-imperialist system, the development of capitalism in the periphery has of course not led to the growth of income and living standards of the vast majority of the population. On the contrary, the agrarian economy has continued to stagnate and the majority of the rural population has been consigned to a life of poverty and misery.
Aggregate level data suggests that the two main forms through which the surplus product of direct producers is extracted are (a) surplus value through the institution of wage-labour (which rests on equal exchange), and (b) surplus value through unequal exchange (which mainly affects petty producers) where input prices are inflated and output prices deflated for the direct producers due to the presence of monopoly, monopsony and interlinking of markets; semi-feudal forms of surplus product extraction, through the institution of tenant cultivation and share cropping, has declined over time. Merchant and usurious capital continues to maintain a substantial presence in the life of the rural populace, both of which manage to appropriate a part of the surplus value created through wage-labour, apart from directly extracting surplus value from petty producers through unequal exchange.
The process of class differentiation has been considerably slowed down and complicated due to the steady incorporation of the Indian economy into the global capitalist system, which has supported and even encouraged the growth of a large “informal” production sector. This informal production sector can be best understood as being involved in petty commodity production, both of agricultural and nonagricultural commodities. Petty commodity production refers to the organization of production where the producer owns the means of production and primarily uses family and other forms of non-wage labour in the production process. Petty commodity production is exploited mainly by merchant and usurious capital where the main form of surplus extraction is through the mechanism of unequal exchange and not through the institution of wage-labour; unequal exchange is often facilitated and maintained through interlinked product, labour and credit markets. The coexistence of both wage-labour and petty commodity production, whereby landless labourers, marginal farmers and small farmers participate in both, in one as free labour and in the other as owner-producer, has impeded the development of proletarian class consciousness and complicated the task of revolutionary politics. It is to a detailed study of petty commodity production in the non-agricultural sector that we now turn.
INFORMAL INDUSTRY: TRENDS AND SUMMARY
In the second part of this study we have attempted to take a broad look at the organization of informal industry in India. In particular we have focused on the evolution of firm size, the types of production relations and the modes of surplus extraction prevailing in informal industry. The following conclusions can be drawn:
1. The industrial sector as a whole (formal and informal) has not expanded greatly in terms of employment in the past three decades and today stands at around 18% (compared to China’s 24%) of total employment in the Indian economy.
2. The informal sector still accounts for around 75% of industrial employment in India. The employment share of the formal sector in general and large-scale industry in particular has been stagnant for the past three decades.
3. Informal industry produces a wide variety of commodities including food products, textiles, wood and metal products and provides services to several types of heavier and more capital-intensive industry.
4. The number of informal firms and workers has been more of less stationary since the 1980s and the relative share of petty-proprietorships, marginal and small capitalist firms is also largely unaltered.
5. As expected most informal firms do not own substantial amounts of capital equipment. The land or building on which the firm is situated accounts for 60-80% of asset value for informal firms.
6. Even though GVA for the formal sector far outstrips GVA in the informal sector, value added in informal industry has increased significantly in the last decade. Since the number of workers has remained more or less the same, this suggests that labor productivity has been rising in this sector.
7. The relations of production in informal industry are neither purely independent producer (characterized by producer’s ownership of labor and capital) nor only industrial capitalist (characterized by a proletarian workforce and a real subsumption of labor to capital). Rather a spectrum of putting-out relations based on formal subsumption of labor and a reliance on extraction of absolute rather than relative surplus value is observed.
8. In addition to putting-out arrangements, nominally self-employed or independent producers are often locked into a relation of dependency vis-à-vis merchant and finance capital. This situation is closely analogous to the position of the peasant in the countryside with respect to intermediaries.
9. Piece-wages, unequal exchange, bonded labor, contingent and casual labor, and gender and caste oppression all conspire to increase the producer’s exploitation largely via extraction of absolute surplus value.
10. In the face of the failure of modern industry to expand satisfactorily, informal industry has acted as the “employer of last resort” for surplus labor in the agricultural sector. Relations of dependency and lack of resources as well as incentives for technical change keep informal workers trapped in low productivity, low wage work. Surplus labor, low wages and intense (self) exploitation in turn create disincentives for technical change.
CONCLUSION
By way of conclusion, we would like to raise some political and philosophical issues and questions for further discussion without in any way claiming to have arrived at any conclusive answers. Though both the authors largely agree to the aggregate trends presented above, we derive different political and social implications from these trends. This derives partly from different political and philosophical perspectives that both of us see ourselves closest to. Rather than paper over our differences, we therefore, present our alternative viewpoints, which might even be contradictory, for further debate and discussion.
The first issue that we would like to put forward for discussion is the continued centrality of the agrarian question to any project for revolutionizing Indian society. This follows simply from the fact that the majority of the working people in India are related, directly or indirectly, with the agricultural sector; this is a direct result of the failure of the structural transformation of the Indian economy. Any attempt, therefore, at radical reconstruction of Indian society will have to deal with the agrarian question effectively. Dealing with the agrarian question will mean, among other things, rapidly increasing the productivity of agricultural activity, the surest way to increase the income of the vast masses of the working people involved in agriculture and thereby create a home market for domestic industry.
But here we come up with some difficult questions that need to be addressed. Traditionally, the Marxist tradition has seen redistributive land reforms as essential to the project of dealing with the agrarian question. The reasons have primarily been political, though some economic arguments have also been developed.2 Politically, land reforms have been seen as a way to decisively break the power of the parasitic class of feudal and semi-feudal landlords; economically, it has been understood as creating conditions for the development of the productive forces in rural society, increasing the productivity of labour, creating a surplus for supporting industrialization and providing a market for domestic industry.
Using Lenin’s distinction between the Prussian and the American paths for bourgeois development in the rural economy lends credence to the call for redistributive land reforms. Discussing the “two forms” of bourgeois development out of the feudal and semi-feudal order characterized by serfdom, he says:
The survivals of serfdom may fall away either as a result of the transformation of landlord economy or as a result of the abolition of the landlord latifundia, i. e., either by reform or by revolution. Bourgeois development may proceed by having big landlord economies at the head, which will gradually become more and more bourgeois and gradually substitute bourgeois for feudal methods of exploitation. It may also proceed by having small peasant economies at the head, which in a revolutionary way, will remove the “excrescence” of the feudal latifundia from the social organism and then freely develop without them along the path of capitalist economy.
Those two paths of objectively possible bourgeois development we would call the Prussian path and the American path, respectively. In the first case feudal landlord economy slowly evolves into bourgeois, Junker landlord economy, which condemns the peasants to decades of most harrowing expropriation and bondage, while at the same time a small minority of Grossbauern (“big peasants”) arises. In the second case there is no landlord economy, or else it is broken up by revolution, which confiscates and splits up the feudal estates. In that case the peasant predominates, becomes the sole agent of agriculture, and evolves into a capitalist farmer. In the first case the main content of the evolution is transformation of feudal bondage into servitude and capitalist exploitation on the land of the feudal landlords—Junkers. In the second case the main background is transformation of the patriarchal peasant into a bourgeois farmer. (Lenin, 1907).
The three main communist streams in India, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation and the Communist Party of India (Maoist) more or less accept this distinction, the first two explicitly and the last one implicitly.3 Hence, for all the three streams the main task (or axis) of the current stage of the Peoples (or New) Democratic Revolution is the agrarian revolution, with redistributive land reforms being one of its main tasks.
While it is true that India, because it did not witness any serious efforts at land reforms on a national scale, developed along the landlord path out of semi-feudalism, there are some important differences that need to be considered. One pole of landlord capitalism, viz., landlessness has been growing over the years; the other pole of landlord capitalism, viz., the continued dominance of a few “big peasants” seems to be at variance with the evidence. Aggregate level data about India that we have seen in the course of this study seems to throw up an unmistakable trend of the declining power of landlords (feudal or otherwise), not by any revolutionary means but just by the sheer pressure of demographic developments and economic stagnation. The total land owned by the large landholding families, the “big peasants” that Lenin refers to, have halved over the last five decades and today they own only about 12 percent of the total land. On the other hand, the land owned by medium-to-small landholding families has increased to over 65 percent. Does this, along with other evidence on the decline of tenancy and the increase of wage-labour, not indicate that the rural economy in India is inexorably being pushed in the direction of peasant capitalism? How would this important trend of the increasing dominance of peasant capitalism, and a gradual whittling down of landlord capitalism, change the course of the agrarian revolution? If landlords, as a class, are dwindling in economic and social power, is a programme aimed at breaking their political power still relevant? Is the contradiction between feudalism and the broad masses of the people still the principal contradiction in India today?
Another issue that will need to be addressed in the context of the slogan for redistributive land reforms is to see whether the resulting farms will be viable in any meaningful economic sense. Let us recall that the average size of ownership holding in India in 2003 was 0.81 hectares; so, the most equitable redistribution will result in the average holding of this size. If instead land is only taken from those owning more than 10 acres and all of it distributed among those currently owning less than 1 acre, then the average size of holding for those receiving redistributed land will roughly become 1.25 acres.
If we juxtapose this with the cost of cultivation data, we can easily see that agricultural units of approximately such sizes will not be economically viable in the sense of being able to generate any surplus product after sustaining a decent level of consumption of the producers. It is extremely doubtful whether these small farms can generate any economic surplus even after the onerous relations of unequal exchange have been removed from the picture. Can they, therefore, help in the industrialization effort by generating surplus or will they instead require a net resource flow in their direction with subsidized credit, power, inputs, etc. to continuously keep them viable? This question is extremely important as was shown in the immediate aftermath of the October revolution in Russia when the revolutionary regime was put in serious jeopardy by a severe food shortage.
The growth of capitalist relations, the continued fragmentation of the land, the decline in tenancy, the unviability of small-scale production and other related factors seem to suggest that a higher form of agrarian development, i.e., collective forms of agricultural production, is gradually being pushed on to the historical agenda of the revolutionary movements in India. Collective, cooperative and socialist forms of large-scale agriculture probably need to be seriously considered as an option emerging out of the very evolution of the material conditions of the vast masses of the working people. The agenda of redistributive land reforms creating bourgeois property in rural areas and facilitating capitalist development needs to be seriously rethought, not because of some ideological reasons but because the development of the agrarian structure seems to demand such a revaluation.
The second large issue raised by our study concerns the mode of industrialization of the Indian economy. It is relatively uncontroversial that a shift of the agricultural population into the secondary and tertiary sectors will be required in order to raise real incomes of the vast majority. How this transformation is to be achieved is the question. The structural transformation required to relieve above-mentioned pressures on agriculture cannot be left to the anarchy of the global capitalist market. The “market-friendly” post-1991 period has been witness to a type of growth that has resulted in rising inequality and increasing number of low-wage, contingent and informal jobs. However the contradictions and problems of the pre-Reform, “planning period” also need to be taken seriously. There is an urgent need to break out of certain simple binaries and equations which have been imposed upon us. The first binary is that between State-managed capitalism and market-oriented capitalism. India’s experience shows that the vast majority of the working population has suffered greatly in both regimes. In our struggle against a particularly predatory type of neoliberal capitalism (whose days may in any case be numbered given the global crisis), we must not find ourselves unwittingly arguing for a return to the bureaucratic and corrupt State. Rather the spectacular failure of the neoliberal model can be an opportunity to demand greater decentralization and more autonomous development. The various people’s movements have been articulating precisely such a model of development.
The second simple equation is between rural areas and agriculture on the one hand, and cities and industry on the other hand. The social and ecological contradictions of the large-scale, capital intensive model of industrialization must be taken seriously. Nowhere has this model produced high levels of employment in an ecologically sustainable fashion while giving producers a say in the running of the workplace. It is becoming increasingly clear that the economic viability of such industrialization is obtained only by cost externalization. The Indian experience points to the necessity for developing dispersed, low capital-intensity, sustainable models of industry that nevertheless raise real incomes of the majority (see Datye 1997 for one such model). This is not a utopian pipe-dream but rather a historical necessity if “development” is not to remain an unfulfilled promise for the majority of Indians.
None of the above can be taken only as a demand for better or more enlightened development policy. Rather it articulates what has already been emerging from social and political movements and in turn seeks to ground the political demands in an empirical and theoretical context. There is a need to extend revolutionary people’s movements rooted in peasant agriculture and national resource struggles into the rural, semi-urban and urban industrial milieu. The urgent question here is how can the dispersed industrial working class be effectively politically organized at a national level? This working class does not always resemble the “classical” doubly-free, urban industrial proletariat. Yet, our attempt here has show that it remains exploited nonetheless and can and should form an important component of left revolutionary politics. Is an artisan-peasant alliance a possibility for the near future?
There is a difference of opinion between the two of us on the question of the model of industrialization that might fruitfully accompany efforts at a radical restructuring of Indian society. While one of us believes, as has been stated in the above paragraphs, that a dispersed, low capital-intensity, sustainable model of industrialization emerges from the Indian experience, the other believes that the scale and geographic dispersal of industrialization per se does not lead to its being more democratic or ecologically sustainable. What is rather more important is the institutional setting within which the industrialization effort is embedded. A small-scale industrialization effort in the context of local level inequalities of class, caste and gender can reinforce those inequalities and nullify all attempts at democratic control of the production process; on the other hand, a large-scale, high capital intensity and centralized industrialization effort within a socialist context might be amenable to democratic control if the institutions of workers’ control are in place. Sustainability, again, seems to have more to do with proper cost-benefit analysis rather than the scale of production as such. In a socialist context, where the surplus product of society is democratically controlled, the pace and direction of technical change will be determined in a rational and scientific manner and not left to the anarchy of capitalist production and the imperatives of profit maximization. In such a setting, internalizing the environmental costs of production would flow naturally from the imperatives of all round social development.
Despite the differing views advanced above, we hope the this study and the accompanying reflections and speculations will serve to fuel discussion and debate among those working for a radical restructuring of Indian society along socialist principles.
(We would like to thanks Debarshi Das and Mohan Rao for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.)
Share and Enjoy:These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
The following is the text of the May Day declaration issued by the Central Committee of the New-Democratic Party.
The on-going cruel war in the North has plunged the Tamil people into an unprecedented human tragedy. With attacks continuing incessantly, tears and blood flow like rivers. The people who emerged from the besiegement of war have been herded into camps without even the basic facilities, in Vavuniya and the Jaffna peninsula. The scenes in the Vanni are much like those obtaining in countries such as Somalia and Sudan. At the same time, the financial and economic crisis that has developed in the South has severely affected the workers, peasants and other toiling masses and severely burdened their lives. India on the one hand and the US and the West on the other are seeking to use the war conditions and the economic crisis to strengthen their respective hegemonic holds on the country. Neither the ruling Mahinda Chinthanaya government nor the UNP, which is striving to come to power, have the ability to rescue the country and the people from this dangerous situation and solve the problems faced by them. Military victory and electoral success based on it will only help to strengthen state power but not serve to provide solutions for the political and economic problems heading towards an abyss. The reality is that there will be no change for the better until the entire workers, peasants and other toiling masses are ready for alternative political thinking and action.
The forthcoming May Day, the day of revolutionary struggle of the workers of the world, is to be celebrated in a new environment in which the workers and oppressed people of the world are launching fresh uprisings. Hence the New-Democratic Party calls upon the people to resolve to mobilise along the path of mass political struggle to urge a just political solution to the national question, which is identified as the main problem facing the country, and to win the rights of all workers including the plantation workers.
The Mahinda Chinthanaya government, since came to power, has not proposed a solution to the national question which has been transformed into war. At the same time, with Indian backing, it is intent on its pursuit of war. Even to this day the government has shown no interest in putting forward a political solution. Likewise, it is preserving indifferent silence on the question of wage increase for plantation workers and other matters affecting the livelihood of the people. Besides, a cabinet sub-committee has proposed a scheme just as disastrous as the Upper Kotmale Scheme, namely that of redistributing large plantations to private smallholders. Through this scheme, the Hill Country Tamils will face severe problems as a class and a nationality, and be forced into a dangerous situation in which they could lose their entire livelihood. Therefore, it is essential to introduce an alternative program and make the plantation workers part of the program.
Also, the climate persists in which democratic, trade union and human rights are being violated and the freedom of the media is being threatened under the State of Emergency. Besides the rejection of demands for wage increases by workers and other employees, security of employment too is being denied.
Although much is spoken about a national economy, liberalisation and privatisation are being carried out in the name of development under the agenda of Globalisation. The country will not see real development or prosperity through them. The war will not be brought to an end. Until a just political solution is put forward for the national question, it will be deception to talk of peace and development for the country.
Hence, on this May Day the New-Democratic Party emphasises that the oppressed working people of the country and the repressed nationalities should mobilise along the path of mass political struggle for the people.
Share and Enjoy:These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
Contents of Appeal from concerned citizens of South Asia to halt the mass murder of Sri Lankan Tamils in the Vanni Area of North Sri Lanka.
Appeal is addressed to: Respected Mr. Ban Ki Moon, UN Secretary General; Respected Ms Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India and Heads of Government of South Asian Countries
________________________________________________________________________________
We are appalled at reports of mass deaths of Sri Lankan Tamils trapped in a small area of the Vanni region in northern Sri Lanka. Both electronic and print media have reported the death of over 700 Tamils in the last couple of days, with only a section of them being identified as LTTE cadres, meaning thereby that a vast number of those killed are civilians trapped in the area. There are serious apprehensions that thermobaric bomb - a bomb that uses a fuel-air explosive capable of creating overpressures equal to an atomic bomb – has been used in this mass killing.
For the last several weeks, we have expressed our concerns about this imminent massacre. In fact we pointed out that the possibilities of almost close to 150,000 Tamilians getting affected was not just most probable but real. We also pointed out that the Sri Lankan Government had been dangling this as the fruit of its declared `war on terror’ as the `final victory’ - and that the Government was pushing for the ‘final solution’ before the soon-to-ensue Sinhala New year day falling on 14th April, 2009.
Our worst fears are turning true. The sheer scale of artillery and explosive attacks and the massive deaths of Tamils points out to the grave situation of the Vanni region becoming the graveyard for thousands of Tamil civilians. Now the perceived usage of thermobaric bomb by the mindless Sri Lankan Army and Government has taken the situation beyond limits. Sri Lanka President Rajapakse himself has threatened ‘complete rout and annihilation’ of Tamils.
Sri Lanka has turned a terror state though they keep blaming LTTE as a terrorist outfit. The brazen and insulting manner by which Sri Lankan authorities have attacked any person or agency seeking accountability of the Sri Lankan Government to human rights standards can be gauged by the fact that several British Parliamentarians were forced to take up the issue of being branded terrorists by the Sri Lankan officials in a debate in the UK House of Commons! Even Louise Arbor, the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and UN Special Rapporteur on Extra Judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston were not spared.
The reality is that the Sri Lankan Government has utilised the so called `war on terror’ as a cover to systematically destroy all democratic processes and institutions in Sri Lanka. Government and its minions have turned the state into a terror apparatus, crushing not just the Tamils, but also others challenging its actions. As a result, numerous non-Tamil, Sinhalese citizens have also fallen prey to the Sri Lankan terror state. Journalists have been the major targets with 19 journalists, both Tamil and Sinhala being killed in the last 2 years, over 35 exiled, driven away from the country or silenced, and numerous publications closed down. The assassination of Lasantha Wickramathunge, Editor of Sunday Leader, a widely respected Sri Lankan weekly in January highlights the fate of anyone challenging the ruling dispensation.
Respected and expert UN bodies have investigated and brought out reports about different aspects of the breakdown of democratic and judicial systems. Recently, on 9th February, 2009, 10 top UN Experts issued a statement sharing the deep concern of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights over the rapidly deteriorating conditions facing civilians in the Vanni region and the significant number of civilian casualties. They also deplored the restrictions on humanitarian access to conflict areas which heightens the ongoing serious violations of the most basic economic and social rights.
We are extremely concerned that in this racist genocide war Sri Lankan government is using banned and illegal weapons and ammunitions, including thermobaric bombs which kills vast numbers of people across a wide territory. Sri Lanka security forces have a long record of using cluster bombs and engaging in aerial targeted bombings of civilian areas which are banned under the Geneva Conventions. Sri Lankan Government has never denied the use of cluster bombs. Across the world there is a tremendous outpouring of anguish and agony at the prospects that surviving Tamil civilians will be mass annihilated through the use of weapons of mass destruction. It is therefore very critical that the UN urgently intervene and restrain the Sri Lankan Government from using banned bombs, explosives and weaponry.
It is very important that the truth about the actual use of these ‘weapons of mass destruction’ including thermobaric bombs be independently verified and its source of supply identified. If indeed these horrific weapons have been used, the international community should immediately initiate prosecution of the highest functionaries of the Sri Lankan state and the Government of the country that supplied these bombs for commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
We would also like to point out that the humanitarian crisis has been made worse because the Sri Lankan Government has banned independent observers of UN agencies, the ICRC and other independent institutions from operating in the war zone. It is of utmost importance that independent observers are sent both to monitor the situation as also to ensure humanitarian aid reaches the area.
The innocent Tamil civilians have been living a precarious life without food, water and health supplies for the last several weeks. Emaciated, starved, severely malnourished and seriously injured, the women, children, aged persons and remaining men are already dying. They deserve the protection that can be offered by concerned world citizens who by demanding an end to the war will also be asserting a chance for these innocent men, women and children to live.
As citizens of South Asia, we therefore demand that the UN and the International Community, effectively intervene to ensure immediate cessation of the brutal and savage war in Sri Lanka and ensure immediate humanitarian relief to the suffering thousands caught in the middle of the war. We also call upon the as also the Governments in the South Asian region, viz., the Government of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives to intervene forcefully to stop the genocidal war that threatens peace not just in Sri Lanka, but in all of South Asia.
________________________________________________________________________________
Appeal is jointly issued by: K.G.. Kannabiran, National President, PUCL, Hyderabad; Justice Rajinder Sachar, former chief Justice, Delhi High Court, Arundhati Roy, New Delhi, Pushkar Raj, General Secretary, PUCL; Pamela Philipose, Women’s Feature Service; Swami Agnivesh, New Delhi, Prof. Amit Bhaduri, Professor Emeritus, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, Rt Rev. P J Lawrence, Bishop of Church of South India, Diocese of Nandyal, Praful Bidwai, Columnist, New Delhi, Sumit Chakravorty, Editor, Mainstream Weekly, New Delhi; Tapan Bose, New Delhi; Rita Manchanda, South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Nepal; Prof Kamal Mitra Chenoy, School of International Studies and President, JNU Teachers Association, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Ernest Deenadayalan, Bangalore; Pradip Prabhu, Kashtakari Sanghatana, Dahanu/Mumbai; Prashant Bhushan, Advocate, Supreme Court, New Delhi, M.G. Devasahayam IAS (Retd), Chennai, Sukumar Murlidharan, Journalist, New Delhi, Rev. Dhyanchand Carr, Madurai, Henri Tiphagne, People’s Watch, Madurai, MSS Pandian, Chennai, Sushil Pyakurel, Former Commissioner, Human Rights Commission of Nepal, Kathmandu, Mubashir Hasan, Lahore, Pakistan and others
——————– The Statement of Concerned South Asian Citizens is being released to the press in Chennai by
Dr. V. Suresh, President, People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) - Tamil Nadu/Puducherry,
Chennai Contact Details: +91-94442-31497; rightstn@yahoo.com
Delhi: Sahana Basavapatna (+91 9968296202); Bipin Kumar (+91 9868280198), The Other Media.
Share and Enjoy:These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
Today is the time of economic crisis. All national and multinational companies are feeling the effect, especially, the workers in them. Millions of workers have lost their jobs throughout the globe. This is not the first time that the workers are facing such problems. Several times in the last century similar problems have been created for workers. In the beginning of this century, after the 9/11 attacks, there was a similar period. Production of workers, i.e., students coming out of universities have outnumbered, by more than a hundred times, the intake capacities of companies. The only solution that has been offered is competition. Study hard… compete and get better appropriated than your fellow mates. There can be just one solution - the “better” students/workers, i.e., those who are compliant to the bosses’ interests and demands, will get or sustain their jobs; and, in that case there will be a growing brigade of unemployed and underemployed (underpaid, casual and temporary) workers, still expecting and competing to get accommodated. All this is because something needs to be sustained in the companies, namely, high profits. That can’t be compromised or shared with workers!!!
Some of us are over-optimistic about getting out with an MBA degree and joining some company in a highly paid managerial post. This section needs to realise that the intake capacity with regard to these posts in companies is much more restricted than that of workers proper. They share the same fate in a much larger magnitude. When there is a reduction in the number of workers, managers who “manage” them will be more and more redundant.
In this process of profit realisation, the sufferer is the student and/or the worker community. They compete and struggle amongst and against each other, weakening themselves ‘as a whole’.
It is high time for this community to get organized and cooperate in their struggle for liberation, rather than compete against each other. It is high time for them to ask themselves what they have lost in the process of competition and assess the magnitude of what they are going to lose if they continue competing blindly. It is high time they get organized and ask the big bosses of companies and the governments as to why ‘we’ have to lead a life of subjugation so that the profit is maintained. It is high time for them to choose between this alternative path of questioning the present state of affairs and the path of blind competition.
Science-Technology-Students’-Workers’ Union (STSWU) is an organization that provides this alternative platform to students and workers to meet the challenges of their class - locally, nationally and internationally.
The film, Slumdog Millionaire depicts the sorry state-of-affairs in our country: extreme poverty, communal carnages, ‘children left to moral and material abandonment’, gangs operating forced beggary, mafia underworld, torture in police custody, arrogance of the elite, insensitivity of the middle class …. In short, it paints the horrendous reality and the ugly face of the Other India and also the dreams, aspirations and heroic struggles of those inhabiting therein. Plausibly, the depiction of the day-to-day heroic struggles of the underdogs in our country looks exotic for the audience from affluent countries (quite like the thrill of an adventurous trekking!) which might explain the reason why the film was a greater success in those countries than in our own country. It depicts the underbelly of the fast-growing economy leaping forward with 8-9 per cent growth even in the midst of the global financial meltdown – the only country, other than China, with impressive growth rates today. For all the criticisms of portraying the gloomy side of the Indian reality, hardly anyone contests the veracity of such a depiction. The film, of course, ends giving illusions of a millionaire’s life even to the slumdogs, an illusion of social mobility that characterises the liberal democratic social order. In other words, a way-out is shown within the bounds of the system itself.
Of course, the upwardly mobile classes in India detest projecting a grim face of India to the world outside because it is thought of as a slur on the image of an India globalising. It took Danny Boyle, a foreigner to paint this ugly face of ‘India shining’. The film reminds us of the statement by B.R. Ambedkar, “Democracy in India is only a top-dressing on the Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic.” The age-old Indian system of multi-layered oppression ensured that most individuals and groups find themselves more privileged with respect to some others, leaving their moral bases for challenging oppression weak. Is it simply that we, the Indian middle and upper classes have ourselves, become too complacent or indifferent towards the day-to-day existential struggles of our ‘long suffering people’, struggles, probably much more severe than in any other Third World country? Or is this cunning of silence to be explained with reference to the fact that the existence of a vast population of have-nots ensures the comfort of the elite. After all, do not the elite of the affluent countries have to take care of their young, cook, wash and do other mundane things by themselves when the elite in India do not have to do any of these? However, the sustainability of this level of comfort is suspect since the existence of a vast population of the underdogs can lead to social upheavals and increased levels of violence in society, an aspect not left untouched by this film. Or is it that we are trapped in the snare of our own patriotism, guided by the mindset that we shouldn’t wash our dirty linen in public?
President Pratibha Patil congratulated the artists of Slumdog Millionaire for “making India proud”. Congress President Sonia Gandhi felt that the team of this film “have done India proud”. Shall we, indeed, become proud of the achievements of these individual artists or put our heads down in shame on the sorry state-of-affairs in our country on the 62nd year of ‘independence’? With the Oscar recognition to the film, “Jai ho” is the new fashion of greeting that is going rounds among the so-called patriotic Indians. But just a minute, please. Jai ho what? Jai ho this sorry state-of-affairs? Jai ho our country, excluding its luckless millions? Let us face it: If only this film leads to serious efforts especially by those in positions of ‘doability’ to undo the evil of unprotected childhoods – a condition of children being left to ‘moral and material abandonment’ could the yells of Jai ho have any meaning or relevance. Can the State, the policy makers and all in positions of ‘doability’ initiate sincere efforts to remove this curse? It is the election year, after all. Let us have serious efforts for the implementation of at least one of the Directive Principles in our Constitution, Article 39(f): “The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment.” Along with the infamous horrors of Nithari near NOIDA, 7,912 children, mostly from very poor backgrounds, gone missing in Delhi during the one and half years from Jan. 2007 to June 2008 and 2210 children gone missing in Delhi during 1 June 2008 to 12 Jan. 2009 (Indian Express, ‘ExpressNewsline’, 3 March 2009, New Delhi) is no mean context for initiating these efforts. Listening to the unthinking yells of Jai ho, one is reminded of two lines from the Telugu poet, N.K.:
Even to this day, the shackles of my country are not broken …
Who has composed a tune for ungotten freedom?
With stunning footage from the mountain forests of Orissa state, India, Survival’s new short film, Mine: Story of a Sacred Mountain tells the current situation of the Dongria Kondh tribe as they face and fight their own destruction. Right now, UK-based, FTSE100 firm Vedanta Resources is pushing ahead with a bauxite mine which will devastate their livelihoods and sacred sites. In this film, their voice is heard. The film is narrated by Indian-born actress Joanna Lumley and features music by Skin.
Quotes
There is no question of any placement of any person or persons. The Dongria Kondh tribe does not reside in this area. Vedanta Resources letter to Survival, 2008
We are used to the Indian government here. But the Vedanta government has come and devastated so many people. They won’t let us live in peace. They want to take these rocks from the mountain. But if they take away these rocks, how will we survive? Because of these the rain comes. The winter comes, the wind blows, the mountain brings all the water. If they take away these rocks, we’ll all die. We’ll lose our soul. Niyamgiri is our soul. Sikaka Lodu, Dongria Kondh man, November 2008
You should go to Lanjigarh and find out how the refinery came to be there. Life is so hard there. Now that people there have realised what is happening they are speaking out against it. Initially they welcomed the company but now they realise their mistake because they live like dogs. Now they realise they’ve lost their land and their homes forever. Vedanta has stolen everything from them. Go to Lanjigarh and see it for yourself. Sikaka Lodu, Dongria Kondh man, November 2008
Listen to me, dear brothers and sisters, did you hear everything? We need people from outside to stand with us. Then we have to fight. Then we can survive. We can save our land. And we can be in charge of our territory. Pidikaka Bari, Dongria Kondh man, November 2008
Suresh Premachandran, Parliament member from Sri Lanka talks about impunity and violation of inalienable rights of Tamil people in Sri Lanka. Suresh is from the northern district of Jaffna in Sri Lanka, currently this area is the most adversely affected by the war. Facing threats to his life for speaking out against government aggression he has moved his family several times in recent years from Sri Lanka, to India, Canada and finally back to India. Suresh talks about the welfare camps, ceasefire agreement, the Sri Lankan government’s want for continuing the war in the name of creating a single ethno country and the need for the global community to speak up. Suresh can be reached at kandiah57@hotmail.com.
RADICAL NOTES IN PRINT NOW!!! Major original contributions in Radical Notes, considerably revised by the authors in response to on-and-off-site comments, are now printed as books and booklets by Aakar Books.
Radical Notes-4THE SRI LANKAN CRISIS AND THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS by S. Sivasegaram, ISBN - 978-81-89833-85-5, Price: Rs 95.
Radical Notes-3THE US FINANCIAL CRISIS by Deepankar Basu, ISBN - 978-81-89833-84-8, Price: Rs 50.
Radical Notes-2NEOLIBERALISM AND HINDUTVA by Shankar Gopalakrishnan, ISBN - 978-81-89833-80-0, Price: Rs 50.
Radical Notes-1AKHTARUZZAMAN ELIAS - BEYOND THE LIVED TIME OF NATIONHOOD by Pothik Ghosh, ISBN - 978-81-89833-50-3, Price: Rs 50.
To place your order, contact us at: publications@radicalnotes.com OR
Aakar Books
28-E, Pocket-IV
Mayur Vihar Phase-I
Delhi-110 091, India
Phone: 91-11-2279 55 05
Telefax: 91-11-2279 56 41
E-mail: aakarbooks@gmail.com
Share and Enjoy:These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
Indian central government policy on the national question of Sri Lanka has always given priority to India’s regional interests. Policy making has been aimed at not just exercising hegemony over the whole of South Asia but beyond it to cover the whole of Asia. In particular, it has been compelling every South Asian country to accept its role as ‘big brother’. Refusal has been met with threats or attacks under some pretext. Sri Lanka, for example, has experienced this in the past.
Sri Lanka has strategic importance due to its geographic location in the Indian Ocean. The US, the West and India need the island of Sri Lanka in their respective bids for global or regional dominance. It was when JR Jayawardane, out of loyalty to the US, sought to surrender the country to the US, that Indira Gandhi and India took a keen interest in Sri Lanka. The opportunity came when ethnic violence was unleashed on the Tamils in 1983. India used it as pretext to get involved in Sri Lanka and used the issue as a device to serve its own purposes.
The conservative Tamil nationalist leadership, which was incapable of analysing why India showed an interest or assess it from a long term perspective, trusted India in full faith, from its standpoint of narrow nationalism. It was believed that Tamil Eelam will be carved out for the Tamils like Bangladesh was carved out of Pakistan in 1971 by the Indian armed forces under the leadership of Indira Gandhi. Sadly, a vast majority of the Tamil people were convinced to that effect by the Tamil United Liberation Front. The Tamil nationalists also ridiculed the logical arguments put forward by Marxist Leninists who placed before the people the facts and the objective reality to firmly declare that Tamil Eelam was not feasible in this fashion. They even denounced Marxist and socialist positions and expressed to the hilt their loyalty to India. Another group was immersed in its faith in the US and the West which were instrumental in the creation of Israel.
It was amid such developments that India began to strengthen its position to tighten its grip on the whole of Sri Lanka. The present Mahinda Chinthana government suits that purpose very well. Indian economic infiltration has gushed with speed into Sri Lanka, and has developed to the extent that Sri Lanka could soon be considered a strong colonial possession of India. India will not tolerate anything that stands in the way of this development. The chauvinistic government of Sri Lanka and the hegemonic state of India concur on this. The manifestation of this is evident from the activities of the Mahinda Chinthana government during the past three years.
India has resented the influence and interference of the US, the West and Japan in the Sri Lankan national question. There lies the essence of the inherent rivalry for regional hegemony. Having realised that the international allies of the LTTE had a foothold in the US and the West and knowing the implications of Norwegian facilitation and the role of Ranil Wickramasinghe in it, India began to make its moves; and the Mahinda Chinthanaya government made way for it. Indian hegemonic diplomacy started to act on the economic, political and military fronts. Norway was eased out of its role as facilitator. That was followed by closer ties on the military and political fronts with Sri Lanka, through which there were attacks on the LTTE in the Vanni, military success and a ban on the LTTE.
The US and the West, caught in a dilemma in the context of their strengthening ties with India, found themselves unable to do anything in Sri Lanka and maintain an embarrassed silence. The US and the West are on a low key in the face of the bellowing by the Sri Lankan government about its war against terrorism, since they had already banned the LTTE and Sri Lanka followed suit. Under the conditions, it is only the support from Tamilnadu that is a voice of consolation to the Tamils. But anyone who knows anything of the acrobatics of Tamilnadu politics will also know that it is not a sincere and unanimous voice. The political parties of Tamilnadu can only plead with the central government of India but cannot compel it to do anything. It has not happened in the past and it will not happen in the future either.
The central government of India will not come forward to bring an end to the war in Sri Lanka, since the war in Vanni was commenced on its signal. It has provided military assistance in many ways including the supply of arms. After all this, for the Tamil side to plead with the central government and the Tamilnadu state government is a show of weakness arising from the lack of a policy of self-reliance in struggle.
The Tamil parties conduct themselves in a manner where they seem to plead that, irrespectively of whether they are struck, kicked or spat on by India, India remains their master. Is this not an insult to “the self respecting Tamil race”? It is, however, not possible to change this attitude of expectations on the part of the Tamil leadership. Their reactionary politics is marinated with it.
Members of the Tamil National Alliance made several trips to meet the Indian premier Manmohan Singh, but failed to have even five minutes of hearing. It was said that Sonia Gandhi had pledged to Karunanidhi that Pranab Mukherjee will be sent to Sri Lanka. But the one who turned up was Shivashankar Menon who discussed matters of mutual interest. The unending pleas of the TNA which fail to appreciate the implications of these developments only further humiliate the Tamil people. Rival Tamil leaders will not free themselves of this. One after the other they will seek to define themselves as devotees of India. Indian hegemony thus seems to have penetrated at various levels.
In contrast to this, there is a need for the emergence of honest and far-sighted political forces from among the Tamils. Past experiences need to be studied; and decisions should be based on a long-term view of how the right to self-determination within a united Sri Lanka can be won, and about the policies and principles appropriate to the decisions. There should be clear decisions about who their friends and who the enemies are. The ordinary Sinhalese in the South should be persuaded that it will be possible to build a united, strong and prosperous Sri Lanka by the establishment of autonomies and autonomous units for the nationalities as a political solution to the national question.
No struggle could be won merely with brave fighters and modern weapons alone. The struggle should be a people’s struggle where the people decide their own fate and become the heroes of the struggle. On the other hand, a handful of fighters, however brave they may be, cannot fight on their behalf and win. This is the lesson that history has taught us. That “people and the people alone are the motive force of history” should be an unforgettable lesson of history. In a true struggle of the people, the people have never been defeated. The final victory is always theirs. That requires taking a clear and correct line of struggle. To seek the bases for it is what is essential today for the Tamil people.
Translation of article in Tamil, Puthiyapoomi, Jan-Feb 2009
Courtesy: New Democracy - Theoretical Organ of the New Democratic Party (Sri Lanka), February 2009
Share and Enjoy:These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
Is there really a Palestinian bourgeois class, which shares socio-political interests with its Israeli counterpart? For the very same reason that explains the absence of a working class movement in Palestine, there is no capitalist solidarity in that region as well. There have been working class leaders who have failed their class without being bourgeois themselves.
There is greater out-migration from Israel than there is immigration into the country. There is no material pressure to expand territory. After all, Israel did vacate Gaza. You are willing to compromise with Hamas’s Islamicism. Why can’t the Hamas accept Israel in the same spirit? - TK Arun
Dear TK,
I will attempt to address only the fundamental theoretical questions you have raised in your response to my piece on Palestine here. I’ll leave out some of the more empirical details that you have brought up.
To begin at the beginning, capitalist solidarity does not necessarily preclude struggle within capitalism among various sections of the bourgeoisie. In fact, the hegemonic social logic of capital, which would be constitutive of such solidarity, is of competitive socialisation. Capitalist solidarity is, therefore, not without stratification, and domination of one or more sections of the bourgeoisie by others. Capitalist solidarity can never, precisely because of this constitutive logic, be truly envisaged as absolutely horizontal. To that extent, there is no equality, even within the bourgeoisie, in capitalism. And to my mind solidarity among various sections of capitalists cannot, unlike socialist solidarity, be conceptualised (repeat conceptualised) as an absolute state. It exists, provisionally if you like, only in relation to their domination of the working class. I have, if you go back to my piece, said that the PLO-PA - and the Palestinian social groups embodied by them - also pose a Palestinian identity of struggle against Israel. But the decline in the radical tenor of resistance as posited through this ’secular’ identity, seen in conjunction with its rejection by the Gazan underclass and the ascendancy of Hamas and its Islamism as the principal idiom of Palestinian resistance, indicates that there is a Palestinian bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie, even as it poses a struggle (competitive) against the Israeli state, and the Jewish bourgeoisie it embodies, for a better position within the larger regional capitalist hegemony, also seeks to protect and preserve its own interests against the assault of the Palestinian underclass. The PLO-PA’s collaboration, ever since Oslo, with the Israeli state to marginalise and even crush Hamas on one hand, and continuing to pose a Palestinian identity of struggle against Israel, on the other, is symptomatic of this strange capitalist paradox called competitive solidarity of the bourgeoisie. You will surely agree, and I have adduced examples to that effect in my article, that the Palestinian question posed by PLO-PA, post Oslo, is an apology of resistance in that it has been perfectly amenable to and even a participant in Israel’s insidious undermining of the Oslo Accords. Or, how else does one explain the failure of the Mahmoud Abbas-led group’s failure to forge a solid solidarity between West Bank and Gaza and conduct resistance against Israel with the same doggedness that Al Fatah, the Yasser Arafat-led main faction of the PLO, did in its heyday. That is something that Hamas has been doing. If anything, Abbas has used the PA security forces, and wonder of wonders Fatah fighters, to quell anti-Israeli dissent within Palestinian society not only in Gaza but also sometimes in West Bank.
If you argue that Hamas too is posing the question of self-determination in the idiom of competition I would certainly not disagree. Given that it’s not a self-conscious proletarian subjectivity, it sure is not self-reflexively aware that the question of political autonomy it’s raising cannot really be resolved unless it’s informed by a politics that shifts the horizon of socialisation from competition (capitalist) to non-alienated association and dialogue (trans- or counter-capitalist). Yet, at this moment this competitive posing of the ‘Islamised’ national Palestinian identity of Hamas - given that it is located in that section of Palestinian society (underclass) that is disenfranchised, dispossessed and dominated by a constellation of various institutionalized and alienated configurations of socio-political power formed by the PLO-PA and the Zionist state together as also separately - objectively poses the decimation of the competitive social logic of capitalism and its hegemony in the region. A hegemony that is, at this moment, precisely, the root cause of this dispossession and domination of a section of Palestinians. By the same token, the PLO-PA’s competitive ’struggle’ against Israel, considering that it simultaneously seeks to collaborate with it, is an attempt to keep certain sections of Palestinian society at bay and, therefore, seeks to preserves and perpetuate the hegemony of capitalism and its competitive social logic and ideology.
I would, of course, join you in ruing the fact that working class forces have grasped this objective conjunctural situation neither in their theoretical analyses nor political practice. For, only that would break and displace the conjuncture towards a more ideologically proletarianised situation. And yet, that will not be any reason for me to simply reject a political subjectivity, which foregrounds this objective autonomy-association question sharply, merely because it’s not self-conscious of what its subjectivity actually amounts to in the objective realm. Of course, Hamas, or any such agency, will have to be critiqued for its deficit on those terms of self-consciousness. But that to my mind is not accomplished by painting it with the same moral-secular brush of Islamism that is used to taint forces like Al Qaeda or Lashkar-e-Toiba.
Coming back to a problem that has often cropped up in most of our discussions and debates, class for me is, in its essence, not a social identity or group. Though it can appear in that form sometimes. (Hegel’s “the essence must appear” or Marx’s “Class qua class”.) Class, for me, is a logic of relation. When competition happens, as is capitalism’s wont, in its moments of circulation (social) and distribution/regulation (political), we have to see in totality, by retroactive location in the moment of production (economic), what is the point from which absolute extraction of value occurs. The social group or identity that occupies that point at that moment is the form that the working class takes at that moment. In other words, politico-cultural identities have to be located within this matrix of social relations to figure out which class position they hold in themselves. And that would be irrespective of whether or not they display a subjective consciousness of their objective class location (or position) in positing their respective identities.
Your analysis seems to be informed by an economistic view of Marxism and class politics, which conflates the working class with workers and the bourgeoisie with a specific section among them: the industrial capitalists. But in my analysis West Asia, particularly Israel-Palestine, does not need to have heavy-duty industrialisation and thus industrial capitalists and industrial workers, for us to find either the working class or the bourgeoisie in that region. Capital, if I may repeat myself, is a certain configuration of social power.
Therefore, your assertion that there is no working class movement in the region is right. But not for the reasons you seem to imply. This absence is because, as I state above, the left forces in the region, which had some significant presence there once, have not been able to grasp, either in theory or in political practice, the conjuncture of Hamas’s emergence and critically engage with that conjuncture and thereby the Palestinian movement that has engendered a force like Hamas. If that sounds a tad voluntaristic and utopian, let me complete the dialectic, which will dissolve this subjective voluntarism into its objectivity, by saying the same thing from a different angle: only if Hamas succeeds in enabling a truly nationally (repeat nationally) self-determined Palestinian state would the Palestinian society have taken yet another step towards founding such a working class movement. The institutionalisation of Hamas, which the founding of such a nation-state would entail, would lead to the emergence of a new elite and bureaucracy from the currently struggling sections of Palestinian society, its concomitant alienation from the masses and the complete instrumentalisation of its Islamism, something that is at times visible now as fascism at the Palestinian community level.
All that would further deepen the objective conditions for the emergence of a significant working class politics in Palestine. Of course, subjective intervention to seize this objective moment would still be required. And we, who do politics in the shadow of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the elimination of the Tudeh Party by Khomeini’s band of Islamists, know all too well the heavy price to be paid for not seizing the objective moment through subjective ideological intervention. After all, only that can rupture the conjuncture. Similarly in Palestine. Hamas’s success and institutionalisation, going by the current configuration of political forces, could well lead to the emergence of more radical outfits such as the Islamic Jihad as the principal agency of Palestinian resistance. But Hamas’s marginalisation through military force, precisely what Israel has been trying to accomplish, would surely compel large sections of the beleaguered Palestinian underclass to vest their despair in the pernicious chimera of a hope that the pan-Islamism of Al Qaeda offers. Such perils in political struggles cannot, clearly, be pre-empted. They have to be faced even at the risk of making grave mistakes. For, if people eschew struggles for fear of the perils such struggles are likely to produce there would be no hope of them emancipating themselves. We would do well to recall Mao, who in his peculiarly Chinese Jacobin style used to say, “A revolution is not a dinner party.”
By the way, an aside: revolutionary forces in Palestine might be down but they are not out. Fighters of George Habbash’s Popular Front have reportedly been fighting the Israeli incursion shoulder to shoulder with the guerrillas of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The opportunity for a socialist revolutionary subjective intervention has not exactly been lost in Palestine.
Pothik Ghosh
Share and Enjoy:These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
